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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2009, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) released a panel report on 
China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights.1 The dispute concerned the inadequacy 
 
* Copyright © 2011 Peter K. Yu. Kern Family Chair in Intellectual Property 
Law and Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, Drake University Law 
School; Wenlan Scholar Chair Professor, Zhongnan University of Economics and 
Law; Visiting Professor, Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies, 
University of Strasbourg. The Author is grateful to Lindsey Purdy and Megan 
Snyder for excellent research and editorial assistance. 
 1. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement 
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of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) 
in China under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights2 (“TRIPS Agreement”). While both 
China and the United States quickly declared victory in this dispute, 
the dispute’s outcome was more correctly viewed as a tie between 
the two parties.3 
Pursuant to the panel report, China amended Article 4 of its 
Copyright Law4 and Article 27 of its Regulations on Customs 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights5 (“Customs Regulations”) 
in spring 2010. By faithfully implementing the panel’s 
recommendations, and by continuing its role as a responsible WTO 
citizen, China effectively ended its TRIPS enforcement dispute with 
the United States. 
 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter TRIPS 
Enforcement Panel Report]. 
 2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 3. This view was strongly supported by the fact that neither side appealed the 
panel report to the Appellate Body. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement 
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1676558. 
 4. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(中华人民共和国著作权法) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 4 
[hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law], available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6062. Pursuant to this amendment, the first sentence of 
Article 4, which the WTO panel found to be inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement, was removed. The second sentence, which stated that “[c]opyright 
owners, in exercising their copyright, shall not violate the Constitution or laws or 
prejudice the public interests,” remained intact and became the first sentence. This 
sentence is then followed by a newly added sentence, which stipulates: “The 
publication and dissemination of works shall be subject to the administration and 
supervision of the state.” See generally Yu, supra note 3 (discussing the 2010 
amendment to Article 4 of Chinese Copyright Law). 
 5. Decision of the State Council on Amendment of the Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Mar. 24, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), translated 
at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/asiareport/201005/2010 
0506903349.html (amending Article 24 of the Customs Regulations to stipulate 
that “the customs may lawfully auction them after the infringement features have 
been eliminated, but for imported goods with counterfeited trademarks, except for 
special circumstances, such goods shall not be permitted to be traded only by 
clearing off the trademarks” (emphasis added)). 
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The dispute is important from the standpoint of WTO 
jurisprudence. It represents the first time a WTO panel focused 
primarily on the interpretation and implementation of the TRIPS 
enforcement provisions.6 In addition to examining in great detail and 
depth the obligations under Articles 41, 46, 59, and 61 of the TRIPS 
Agreement,7 the panel also briefly explored the implications of 
Articles 1.1 and 41.5—key safeguards against demands for 
overzealous enforcement of intellectual property rights.8 As 
developed countries—notably, the United States, the European 
Union, Japan, and Switzerland—continue to demand stronger 
international intellectual property enforcement norms through the 
highly controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement9 
(“ACTA”) and other bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade 
agreements, this panel report is likely to have special significance. 
To be certain, this panel report involves a bilateral dispute 
between China and the United States and therefore has limited value 
to third parties in the less developed world, which include both 
developing and least developed countries. Nevertheless, because the 
dispute involves the two largest economies in the world, it will have 
serious ramifications for intellectual property developments in other 
WTO members. Indeed, the issues addressed in the dispute were so 
important that twelve third parties participated in the panel 
proceedings. Out of them, half were developing countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey.10 Except for India and 
 
 6. This panel report, however, is not the first one involving a TRIPS provision 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights. In United States—
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the WTO panel and 
subsequently the Appellate Body examined Section 211 of the U.S. Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998 in relation to Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement. See 
Panel Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 
WT/DS176/R (Aug. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Section 211 Panel Report]; Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 
WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 7. TRIPS Agreement arts. 41, 46, 59, 61. 
 8. Id. arts. 1.1, 41.5. 
 9. See Draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417. See generally Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and 
Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624813. 
 10. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 1.6. The other third 
parties were Australia, Canada, the European Communities, Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
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Turkey, all of these countries either provided a written submission to 
or made an oral statement before the WTO panel.11 
This article focuses on the implications of this panel report for less 
developed countries. Part I recapitulates the key arguments made by 
China and the United States as well as the major findings in the 
report. Parts II and III then evaluate the report from the standpoint of 
less developed countries. Part II, in particular, explores six areas in 
which the panel report has enabled less developed countries to score 
some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Part III concludes by examining three areas in which the report has 
provided some disappointments. 
I. CLAIMS 
In April 2007, the United States requested consultations with 
China concerning the latter’s failure to protect and enforce 
intellectual property rights pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement.12 The 
complaint focused on four particular issues: (1) the high thresholds 
for Chinese criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual 
property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to 
properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the 
denial of copyright protection to works that have not been authorized 
for publication or dissemination within China; and (4) the 
unavailability of criminal procedures and penalties in China for 
infringing activities that involved either reproduction or distribution, 
but not both. 
Since the filing of the WTO complaint, consultations between the 
two parties resolved the last claim. As a result, the United States 
requested the DSB to establish a panel to examine only the three 
remaining claims.13 Serving as the panel chair was Adrian Macey, a 
New Zealand diplomat who was involved in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)/WTO negotiations during the 
 
 11. See id. Annex C. 
 12. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/1 
(Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Complaint]. 
 13. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights, WT/DS362/7 (Aug. 21, 2007) [hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel 
Request]. 
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Uruguay Round. The other two panelists were Marino Porzio, a 
Chilean lawyer who served as WIPO Deputy Director General 
during 1980–1987, and the late Sivakant Tiwari, a Singaporean 
government attorney who chaired the APEC Intellectual Property 
Rights Experts’ Group.14 
After some initial delay, the long-awaited report was finally 
released in January 2009. As I have provided elsewhere a full 
analysis of this report,15 this Part only briefly summarizes the key 
claims made by China and the United States as well as the panel’s 
major findings. To parallel the claims laid out in the original 
complaint, this Part discusses the claims in the same order, even 
though the panel report examined them in the reverse order. 
A. CRIMINAL THRESHOLDS 
The first claim concerned the thresholds for criminal procedures 
and penalties. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement states that 
“[m]embers shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be 
applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale.”16 Because each WTO 
member is required to apply criminal procedures and penalties to all 
cases involving “wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy 
on a commercial scale,” the United States claimed that China had 
failed to honor its TRIPS commitments by including in its laws high 
thresholds for applying criminal procedures and penalties to 
intellectual property infringement.17 In the United States’ view, the 
thresholds provided a safe harbor to shelter pirates and counterfeiters 
from criminal prosecution.18 China therefore failed to provide 
criminal enforcement and remedies as required by Articles 61 and 
41.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, respectively.19 
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the country 
had in place a unique alternative administrative enforcement system 
that “does not have a parallel in most Western systems, including the 
 
 14. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 1.5. 
 15. See generally Yu, supra note 3 (providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
WTO panel report). 
 16. TRIPS Agreement art. 61. 
 17. Id.; see TRIPS Enforcement Complaint, supra note 12. 
 18. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.494. 
 19. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note 13, at 3. 
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US legal system.”20 Due to limited resources and a vastly different 
socio-legal tradition, public security authorities in China handle 
serious cases (cases above the thresholds), while administrative 
copyright and commerce authorities tackle low-scale infringements 
(cases below the thresholds).21 Thus, instead of providing a safe 
harbor for intellectual property criminals, Chinese law subjects to 
enforcement “infringement on any scale.”22 
China further explained to the panel the complexity of its criminal 
law and the way the United States had misstated the calculation of its 
thresholds. As China noted, although the United States repeatedly 
emphasized how counterfeiters in China could avoid criminal 
punishment by limiting their inventory to 499 copies (in response to 
the 500-copy threshold),23 the thresholds do not operate in such a 
simple and rigid fashion. According to China, courts “may take into 
account multiple acts of infringement, and not simply the income, 
profits, sales or number of copies in a single transaction or at a single 
point in time.”24 They may also calculate the thresholds over a 
prolonged period of time—say, up to five years.25 In addition, courts 
take into account “evidence of collaboration between infringers,” 
using concepts such as joint liability, criminal groups, and 
accomplices as laid out in the Criminal Law.26 They also “consider 
 
 20. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶ 9. 
 21. See id. ¶ 7.476. 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. See, e.g., id. Annex A–1, ¶ 37 (“[I]f a copyright pirate makes 499 
reproductions or a retailer stocks 499 copies in a store, they could not be 
prosecuted or convicted under Article 217 of the Criminal Law based on the copy 
threshold, because the relevant threshold of 500 copies provided by the April 2007 
[Judicial Interpretation] would not be met.”); id. Annex A–2, ¶ 11 (“[T]he Article 
217 500-copy threshold excludes acts of commercial scale piracy, as a copyright 
pirate that makes 499 reproductions or a retailer that stocks 499 copies in a store 
could not be prosecuted or convicted on that basis under Article 217.”); id. Annex 
A–4, ¶ 30 (“499 unfinished copies of a video game not yet bearing an infringing 
trademark still qualify as evidence of a ‘commercial scale’ operation, just as much 
as 499 finished video games bearing such a trademark.”); id. Annex A–6, ¶ 12 
(“The reality is that in China, a producer can make 499 copies, or a retailer can sell 
499 copies, and escape prosecution thanks to the safe harbor created by the 
thresholds for Article 217.”). 
 24. Id. ¶ 7.461. 
 25. See id. ¶¶ 7.457, 7.461. 
 26. Id. ¶ 7.439; see also Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(中华人民共和国刑法) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., July 1, 1979, amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), arts. 25–27, 
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semi-finished or unfinished products . . . [as] evidence of preparation 
and attempt.”27 
In its report, the panel noted that Article 61 is subject to four 
limitations: (1) trademarks and copyrights (as opposed to all forms of 
intellectual property rights covered by the TRIPS Agreement); (2) 
counterfeiting and piracy (as opposed to mere infringement); (3) 
willful acts; and (4) infringements “on a commercial scale.”28 The 
key to deciding the first claim concerned the last limitation. 
Although the term “commercial scale” was “intentionally vague . . . 
and left undefined” in the TRIPS Agreement,29 the panel noted that 
the term was adopted out of “a deliberate choice” and therefore 
“must be given due interpretative weight.”30 
Using the DSB’s customary dictionary approach,31 the panel found 
that the term includes both qualitative and quantitative elements.32 As 
the panel reasoned: “counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a commercial scale’ 
refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or 
extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a given 
product in a given market.”33 The term therefore provides “a relative 
standard, which will vary when applied to different fact situations.”34 
To assess the consistency of China’s criminal thresholds with this 
complex definition, the panel looked to specific conditions in 
China’s marketplace.35 
 
translated at http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207319.htm (providing 
for joint criminal liability and liability for criminal groups and accomplices). 
 27. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.483. 
 28. See id. ¶¶ 7.518–7.528. 
 29. Id. Annex B–1, ¶ 22. 
 30. Id. ¶ 7.543. 
 31. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER ARUP, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
KNOWLEDGE AGREEMENTS 95 (2d ed. 2008) (noting the “front-line use of standard 
dictionaries”); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 77 (2001) (“[A]ll the seven TRIPS dispute 
settlement reports published so far have relied largely on the dictionary 
meaning.”); Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 552 (2009) 
(noting “the ‘dictionary approach’ now common in WTO panel reports”). 
 32. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.538. 
 33. Id. ¶ 7.577. 
 34. Id. ¶ 7.600. 
 35. See id. ¶ 7.604 (“The parties agree that the standard of ‘a commercial scale’ 
will vary by product and market and that the conformity of China’s criminal 
thresholds with that standard must be assessed by reference to China’s 
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Although the United States provided evidence in the form of press 
articles and industry and consultant reports,36 the panel found the 
evidence insufficient to “demonstrate what constituted ‘a commercial 
scale’ in the specific situation of China’s marketplace.”37 As the 
panel declared, it did not “ascribe any weight to the evidence in the 
press articles . . . . [E]ven if it did, the information that these press 
articles contain is inadequate to demonstrate what is typical or usual 
in China for the purposes of the relevant treaty obligation.”38 
In sum, without determining whether China has satisfied its TRIPS 
obligations, the WTO panel found that the United States had failed to 
substantiate its claim. China therefore prevailed on what many 
commentators and rights holders have considered the most important 
claim in the dispute.39 
 
marketplace.”). 
 36. See id. ¶¶ 7.615–7.616. As the panel stated: 
  In its rebuttal of China’s assertion regarding the scale of commerce in China, the 
United States noted that the “commercial scale” standard was a relative one. It 
commented on the Economic Census statistics submitted by China but at the same 
time dismissed their relevance as they are aggregate statistics related to undefined 
average economic units. It also recalled an earlier assertion that the Chinese market, 
including the market for many copyright and trademark-bearing goods, is fragmented 
and characterized by a profusion of small manufacturers, middlemen, distributors, and 
small outlets at the retail level. 
  The Panel has reviewed the evidence in support of this assertion. The evidence 
comprises a quote from a short article from a US newspaper, the San Francisco 
Chronicle, titled “30,000–Store Wholesale Mall Keeps China Competitive” regarding 
the number of stores in a particular mall in Yiwu and the physical dimensions of some 
stalls; a statistic quoted from an extract from a management consultant report titled 
“The 2005 Global Retail Development Index” that the top ten retailers in China hold 
less than 2 per cent of the market, and another statistic that the top 100 retailers have 
less than 6.4 per cent; and a quote from an article in Time magazine titled “In China, 
There’s Priceless, and for Everything Else, There’s Cash” that a shopping mall in 
Luohu spans six floors of small stores. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 37. Id. ¶ 7.614. 
 38. Id. ¶ 7.629. 
 39. See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.–China WTO 
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 118–19 (2008) 
(contending that the criminal thresholds claim is “the most significant claim in the 
United States’ complaint”); Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn’t Bite: 
15 Years of Intellectual Property Disputes at the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 389, 414 (2010) (pointing out that the criminal threshold claim “was 
no doubt its most important claim in this dispute”). 
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B. DISPOSAL OF INFRINGING GOODS 
The second claim concerned the ability of the Chinese customs 
authorities to properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the 
border. Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement provides: 
Without prejudice to other rights of action open to the right holder and 
subject to the right of the defendant to seek review by a judicial authority, 
competent authorities shall have the authority to order the destruction or 
disposal of infringing goods in accordance with the principles set out in 
Article 46.40 
Article 46 states further: 
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have 
found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of 
outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm 
caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing 
constitutional requirements, destroyed.41 
Taken together, these two provisions require a WTO member to 
empower its judicial authorities to order the uncompensated 
destruction or disposal of infringing goods seized at the border. 
Because these provisions only lay out an empowerment obligation, 
as compared to mandating a specific action, the WTO members are 
not required to “exercise [the stipulated] authority in a particular 
way, unless otherwise specified.”42 Instead, the authorities retain a 
high degree of discretion to determine their preferred actions. 
In light of this limited obligation, the United States could not 
argue that the Chinese customs authorities had failed to destroy 
infringing goods seized at the border—the action the U.S. 
administration and its supportive rights holders preferred. Instead, 
the United States advanced a much weaker, and rather academic, 
argument that China introduced a “compulsory scheme” that took 
away the authorities’ “scope of authority to order the destruction or 
 
 40. TRIPS Agreement art. 59. 
 41. Id. art. 46. 
 42. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.238. As the panel 
recounted, “[p]revious drafts of the TRIPS Agreement had provided that the 
authorities shall ‘provide for’ certain remedies, but this phrasing was changed to 
read shall ‘have the authority’, as were a number of other draft provisions.” Id. 
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disposal of infringing goods.”43 
In particular, the United States argued that Article 27 of the 
Chinese Customs Regulations,44 in conjunction with the relevant 
implementing measures and a public notice from the customs 
authorities, created a “compulsory scheme” that has taken away the 
ability of the customs authorities to exercise their discretion.45 This 
scheme precluded the authorities from destroying the infringing 
goods unless they found it inappropriate to donate the goods to 
charities, sell them back to rights holders, or auction them off after 
eradicating the infringing features. 
In response to the U.S. claims, China pointed out that the sequence 
merely expressed “an official preference” for disposition methods.46 
Under this flexible arrangement, China claimed, its customs 
authorities still had wide discretion to determine whether the stated 
criteria had been met. In fact, as the panel observed, there were 
“circumstances in which Customs departs from the terms of the 
measures.”47 The panel therefore found “the measures . . . not ‘as 
mandatory’ as they appear on their face.”48 
To the surprise of the United States and many intellectual property 
rights holders, the WTO panel began by praising China for providing 
“a level of protection higher than the minimum standard required” by 
 
 43. Id. ¶ 7.197. 
 44. Article 27 of the Regulations on Customs Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights provided: 
Where the confiscated goods which infringe on intellectual property rights can be used 
for the social public welfare undertakings, Customs shall hand such goods over to 
relevant public welfare bodies for the use in social public welfare undertakings. Where 
the holder of the intellectual property rights intends to buy them, Customs can assign 
them to the holder of the intellectual property rights with compensation. Where the 
confiscated goods infringing on intellectual property rights cannot be used for social 
public welfare undertakings and the holder of the intellectual property rights has no 
intention to buy them, Customs can, after eradicating the infringing features, auction 
them off according to law. Where the infringing features are impossible to eradicate, 
Customs shall destroy the goods. 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Customs Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 2, 2003, 
effective Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
text.jsp?file_id=199159. 
 45. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.197. 
 46. Id. ¶ 7.329. 
 47. Id. ¶ 7.348. 
 48. Id. 
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the TRIPS Agreement.49 For example, China has extended border 
measures to not only piracy and counterfeiting, but also other forms 
of copyright, patent, and trademark infringements.50 Thanks to U.S. 
pressure in the early-to-mid-1990s51 and with strong influence from 
the European Union,52 these border measures have been further 
extended to both imported and exported goods even though Article 
59 covers only imported goods.53 
With respect to donations and sales to rights holders, the WTO 
panel noted that Article 59 “do[es] not indicate that the authority to 
order the specified types of remedies must be exclusive.”54 While 
donations may help meet public welfare needs and are suitable to 
conditions in less developed countries,55 sales to rights holders can be 
justified by the fact that some rights holders may want to purchase 
unauthorized overruns that are qualitatively identical to the 
authorized manufactures.56 The panel even accepted the use of 
 
 49. Id. ¶ 7.228. 
 50. See id. ¶ 7.226 (“It is apparent that the intellectual property right 
infringements covered by the Customs measures include not only counterfeit 
trademark goods and pirated copyright goods, but certain other infringements of 
intellectual property rights, namely other trademark-infringing goods, other 
copyright-infringing goods, and patent-infringing goods.”). 
 51. See Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Annex, § 1[G], 
U.S.-China, Feb. 26, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 881, 900–03 (1995) (requiring all customs 
offices to intensify border protection for all imports and exports of CDs, LDs, CD-
ROMS, and trademarked goods). 
 52. See Xue Hong, An Anatomical Study of the United States Versus China at 
the World Trade Organisation on Intellectual Property Enforcement, 31 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 292, 298 (2009) (noting that “Chinese Regulations on Customs 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights follows Regulation 1383/2003 on 
customs actions against goods suspected of infringing intellectual property 
rights”). 
 53. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.227. 
 54. Id. ¶ 7.240. 
 55. See id. ¶ 7.306 (“In one case, Customs donated infringing goods to the Red 
Cross that were allocated to people in areas struck by natural disasters such as 
typhoons, rainstorms and floods. The goods all infringed trademark rights and 
consisted of sport shoes, bags of rice noodles, washing powder, air-cooled chillers 
and kerosene heaters.”). 
 56. See id. Annex B–1, ¶ 38 (“Right-holders may choose to purchase infringing 
goods where, for example, these seized goods are determined to be overruns 
illicitly produced by a licensed manufacturer, and are therefore identical to the 
licensed goods.”). But see id. Annex A–1, ¶ 52 (“[A]nyone who has to pay for 
goods that violates his or her own patent, trademark or copyright is harmed in the 
amount of the payment.”). 
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auctions to dispose of infringing goods. As it explained, because “the 
remedies specified in Article 59 are not exhaustive . . . , the fact that 
authority to order auction of infringing goods is not required is not in 
itself inconsistent with Article 59.”57 
Nevertheless, the panel faulted China for the way its customs 
authorities auctioned off the seized goods. As clearly stated in 
Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement, the provision that provides the 
principles incorporated into Article 59, “[i]n regard to counterfeit 
trademark goods, the simple removal of the trademark unlawfully 
affixed shall not be sufficient, other than in exceptional cases, to 
permit release of the goods into the channels of commerce.”58 
Whether the removal is considered “simple” will depend on whether 
“the state of the goods is altered sufficiently to deter further 
infringement.”59 The panel did not indicate what exactly needs to be 
done to avoid a violation of Article 59. It merely hinted that an 
exceptional case may arise when “an innocent importer . . . has been 
deceived into buying a shipment of counterfeit goods, . . . has no 
means of recourse against the exporter and . . . has no means of 
reaffixing counterfeit trademarks to the goods.”60 It also suggested 
that “[p]ractical requirements, such as removal of the trademark, 
affixation of a charitable endorsement or controls over the use of 
goods or distribution methods, may avoid confusion.”61 
Although China provided additional measures, such as the 
solicitation of comments from rights holders62 and the introduction of 
an expertly-determined reserve price,63 those measures, in the panel’s 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 7.327. 
 58. TRIPS Agreement art. 46. 
 59. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.375. 
 60. Id. ¶ 7.391. 
 61. Id. ¶ 7.284. 
 62. See id. Annex B–1, ¶ 47 (“[R]ight-holders have a legal, formal right to 
comment prior to any public auction; this procedure helps Customs to determine 
that a good would be inappropriate for public auction, and thereby helps avoid 
harm to the right-holders.”); id. Annex B–1, ¶ 53 (“Formal comment . . . allows 
right-holders to identify specific concerns—such as any safety threats that the 
goods pose, or the presence of proprietary design features that cannot be 
removed—and allows Customs to determine that an auction would not be 
appropriate.”). But see id. Annex A–2, ¶ 23 (noting that the right to comment “is 
not a right to prevent the goods from being auctioned”). 
 63. See id. ¶ 7.202 (noting that China Customs “uses a reserve price at auction 
to ensure that infringers do not have the opportunity to purchase the seized goods 
2011] TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 739 
view, did not “create an effective deterrent to infringement”—a key 
objective of Article 46.64 In the end, China lost part of the second 
claim, even though the panel upheld as TRIPS-consistent the use of 
donations, sales to rights holders, and auctions. The panel also 
rejected the U.S. claim that customs actions in China were subject to 
“a compulsory sequence of steps” in violation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
C. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR CENSORED WORKS 
The final claim in the dispute concerned the first sentence of 
Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law, which states that “[w]orks 
the publication and/or dissemination of which are prohibited by law 
shall not be protected by this Law.”65 Under the statute, works can be 
banned by “Criminal Law, the Regulations on the Administration of 
Publishing Industry, the Regulations on the Administration of 
Broadcasting, the Regulations on the Administration of Audiovisual 
Products, the Regulations on the Administration of Films, and the 
Regulations on the Administration of Telecommunication.”66 Based 
on China’s denial of protection to banned works, the United States 
claimed that China had failed to offer protection to copyright holders 
as required by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (“Berne Convention”), which was incorporated 
by reference into the TRIPS Agreement.67 
Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention states: 
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are protected 
under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of 
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter 
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this 
 
at an unreasonably low cost and reaffix counterfeit marks”). 
 64. Id. ¶ 7.373. 
 65. Id. ¶ 7.1; Chinese Copyright Law, art. 4. In lieu of “and/or,” the 
conjunctive “or” was used in the official English translation of the Chinese 
Copyright Law. In the WTO panel report, however, the phrase “and/or” was used 
in Mutually Agreed Translation No. 11. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra 
note 1, ¶ 2.6. 
 66. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.73. 
 67. TRIPS Agreement art. 9.1; TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note 
13, at 5. 
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Convention.68 
Article 5(2) further provides: “The enjoyment and the exercise of 
these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and 
such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in 
the country of origin of the work.”69 By denying copyright holders 
the immediate and automatic enjoyment of their rights, and by 
subjecting copyright to the formalities of a successful conclusion of 
content review, the Chinese Copyright Law, in the United States’ 
view, therefore contravened the Berne Convention. 
In addition, the United States raised arguments based on Article 
41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states: “Members shall ensure 
that enforcement procedures . . . are available under their law so as to 
permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual 
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a 
deterrent to further infringements.”70 According to the United States, 
the Chinese law did not provide any effective action against 
infringement of those copyrighted works that had not passed the 
content review process or that were awaiting the results of the 
review.71 
In response to the U.S. claims, China made a number of 
counterarguments. First, China claimed that the first sentence of 
Article 4 of the Copyright Law was “extremely limited in scope.”72 
Like other countries, China bans from publication or dissemination 
works that consist entirely of unconstitutional or immoral content.73 
Second, China made a bizarre argument concerning the distinction 
between “copyright” and “copyright protection.” As China 
contended, Article 4 did not remove copyright, but denied the 
 
 68. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
5(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 (as revised at Paris, July 24, 
1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
 69. Id. art. 5(2). 
 70. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1; TRIPS Enforcement Panel Request, supra note 
13, at 6. 
 71. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.84. 
 72. See id. ¶ 7.17. 
 73. Such a ban also included “reactionary, pornographic, or superstitious 
contents.” Id. ¶ 7.54. 
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“particularized rights of private copyright enforcement.”74 Authors 
therefore would still have “access” to the enforcement process even 
if they did not have adequate evidence or a valid right to enforce.75 
Third, China insisted that Article 17 of the Berne Convention 
recognizes a country’s sovereign right “to permit, to control, or to 
prohibit . . . the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work 
or production.”76 As China observed, the provision places limitations 
on all rights granted to authors under the Berne Convention and 
“effectively denies WTO jurisdiction in this area.”77 
Finally, China pointed out that public regulations a priori pre-
empt private economic rights. China argued that because the 
copyright in banned works was considered a “legal and material 
nullity,” enforcement of such a right would be meaningless.78 China 
further stated that it “enforces prohibitions on content seriously, 
and . . . this removes banned content from the public domain more 
securely than would be possible through copyright enforcement.”79 
As the ban applies to both copyright holders and potential infringers, 
China claims private enforcement is unnecessary.80 In China’s view, 
content regulatory measures have already provided “an alternative 
form of enforcement against infringement,”81 and therefore meet the 
“effective action” obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.82 
 
 74. Id. ¶ 7.21. 
 75. See id. ¶ 7.178 (“China asserts that the enforcement procedures in Chapter 
V of the Copyright Law are ‘available’ in the sense that the authors of all works 
have ‘access’ to enforcement process irrespective of whether they have adequate 
evidence or a valid right to enforce.”). 
 76. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 17. 
 77. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.120. 
 78. Id. ¶ 7.134; see also id. Annex B–4, ¶ 103 (“When governments exercise 
their sovereign power to censor, the exercise of private rights is moot: 
unauthorized copying is not permitted. Copyright continues, but enforcement is not 
needed: the content is banned.”). 
 79. Id. ¶ 7.137. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. ¶ 7.180. 
 82. See TRIPS Agreement art. 41.1 (“Members shall ensure that enforcement 
procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit 
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights 
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent 
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements.”). 
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Despite this long list of defenses and counterclaims, the WTO 
panel found Article 4 of the Chinese Copyright Law to be 
inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, the panel 
rejected China’s distinction between copyright and copyright 
protection, pointing out that such a distinction would render 
copyright “no more than a phantom right.”83 The panel also noted 
that the enforcement procedures under Article 41.1 are “far more 
extensive” than mere access to the enforcement process.84 In 
addition, the panel noted that, even though China had made a policy 
choice to make available other enforcement procedures, such as 
content regulatory measures, that particular choice “d[id] not 
diminish the member’s obligation under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.”85 
While the panel recognized a country’s sovereign right to censor, 
it pointed out that “copyright and government censorship address 
different rights and interests.”86 In the panel’s view, censorship 
regulations cannot eliminate rights that are inherent in a copyrighted 
work.87 Nor did China satisfactorily “explain why censorship 
interferes with copyright owners’ rights to prevent third parties from 
exploiting prohibited works.”88 Although the panel confirmed that its 
conclusion would not apply to works never submitted for or awaiting 
the results of content review in China, as well as the unedited version 
of works for which an edited version has been approved for 
distribution,89 it recognized the “uncertainty” created by the potential 
 
 83. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.66 (“It is difficult to 
conceive that copyright would continue to exist, undisturbed, after the competent 
authorities had denied copyright protection to a work on the basis of the nature of 
the work and the prohibition in the Copyright Law itself.”). 
 84. Id. ¶ 7.179. 
 85. Id. ¶ 7.180. 
 86. Id. ¶ 7.135. 
 87. As the panel stated: 
A government’s right to permit, to control, or to prohibit the circulation, presentation, 
or exhibition of a work may interfere with the exercise of certain rights with respect to 
a protected work by the copyright owner or a third party authorized by the copyright 
owner. However, there is no reason to suppose that censorship will eliminate those 
rights entirely with respect to a particular work. 
Id. ¶ 7.132. 
 88. Id. ¶ 7.133. 
 89. See id. ¶ 7.103 (basing its conclusion on the fact that that “the United States 
has not made a prima facie case with respect to works never submitted for content 
review in China, works awaiting the results of content review in China and the 
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denial in the absence of a determination by the censorship 
authorities.90 The United States therefore won the third claim 
decisively. 
II. GAINS 
As a technical matter, WTO panel reports cover only the disputing 
parties and have no clear precedential value.91 Nevertheless, WTO 
panels often refer to reports adopted by the Appellate Body or other 
WTO panels. WTO panel reports can also influence the ongoing and 
future development of international intellectual property treaties, 
which are often negotiated or implemented in the shadow of these 
reports.92 In addition, the reports may provide the rhetoric and 
political momentum needed for the various review processes in the 
TRIPS Council, other WTO bodies, and other international 
organizations. This Part explores six areas in which the panel report 
in China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights has enabled less developed countries to 
score some important points in the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 
 
unedited versions of works for which an edited version has been approved for 
distribution in China”). 
 90. Id. ¶ 7.118 (footnote omitted). 
 91. For a trilogy of articles discussing the unsettled nature of this issue, see 
generally Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law 
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The 
Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a 
Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: 
Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873 (2001). 
 92. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS 
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public–Private Initiatives to Facilitate 
Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 61 
(1998) (discussing how less developed countries can treat the TRIPS Agreement 
“as a set of default rules to be bargained around”); Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing 
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The 
Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459, 
476–77 (2004) (noting that countries can negotiate “in the shadow of” the WTO 
dispute settlement process). 
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A. MINIMUM STANDARDS 
By design, the TRIPS Agreement was established as a minimum 
standards agreement.93 Article 1.1 states that “[m]embers may, but 
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement.”94 In its report, the 
WTO panel acknowledged this treaty design. By mentioning the term 
“minimum standard” or its plural form fourteen times, the panel 
underscored its importance to understanding the TRIPS Agreement. 
In so doing, the panel report recognizes the flexibilities retained in 
the TRIPS Agreement and explicitly affirmed in paragraph 5 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.95 The 
report also underscores the autonomy and policy space reserved for 
less developed countries during the TRIPS negotiations. Such 
emphases are important in light of the increasing push by developed 
countries for TRIPS-plus protection through the negotiation of the 
highly controversial ACTA and other bilateral, plurilateral, and 
regional trade agreements.96 
 
 93. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual 
Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 
INT’L LAW. 345 (1995) (discussing how the TRIPS Agreement established 
universal minimum standards in the intellectual property area). 
 94. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. 
 95. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration 
specifically recognizes the following flexibilities: 
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose 
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles. 
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted. 
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, 
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish its 
own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFN and national 
treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4. 
Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International 
Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–400 (2004) 
(discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to create 
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More importantly, reserving autonomy for member states is a 
longstanding tradition in the international intellectual property arena. 
Article 19 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, for example, states that countries “reserve the right to make 
separately between themselves special agreements for the protection 
of industrial property, in so far as these agreements do not 
contravene the provisions of this Convention.”97 Similarly, Article 20 
of the Berne Convention allows countries to enter into special 
agreements “in so far as such agreements grant to authors more 
extensive rights than those granted by the Convention, or contain 
other provisions not contrary to this Convention.”98 Article 19 states 
further that “[t]he provisions of [the Berne] Convention shall not 
preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater 
protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of the 
Union.”99 
In light of this longstanding pro-autonomy tradition, the WTO 
panel deserves considerable praise for meticulously discerning 
China’s minimum obligations in the criminal enforcement area. In its 
first written submission, China argued that the United States should 
have a higher burden in substantiating its criminal thresholds claim 
before the DSB.100 As China stated, “the Panel should treat sovereign 
 
TRIPS-plus obligations); Yu, supra note 9 (discussing the use of ACTA to impose 
TRIPS-plus obligations on other WTO members). 
 97. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 19, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967). 
 98. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 20. The WIPO Internet Treaties 
provide a good example of these special agreements. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105–17, at 1 (1997); WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105–
17, at 18 (1997). 
 99. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 19. 
 100. As China explained: 
In this particular instance . . . the United States bears a significantly higher burden than 
it would normally encounter. That is because the United States is advancing a claim—
that Members of TRIPS must enact criminal laws that meet highly specific 
international standards—that cuts decisively against the tradition and norms of 
international law. 
  International organizations accord great deference to national authorities in 
criminal law matters. A review of international law shows that states have traditionally 
regarded criminal law as the exclusive domain of sovereign jurisdiction; where 
sovereign governments are subject to international commitments concerning criminal 
law, these commitments afford significant discretion to governments regarding 
implementation; and international courts have been exceedingly reluctant to impose 
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jurisdiction over police powers as a powerful default norm, departure 
from which can be authorized only in light of explicit and 
unequivocal consent of State parties.”101 Although China later backed 
away from such a strong sovereignty-based position and asserted 
instead the “well-accepted interpretive canon in dubio mitius,”102 the 
panel took note of China’s position and openly “acknowledge[d] the 
sensitive nature of criminal matters and attendant concerns regarding 
sovereignty.”103 The panel also recognized that “differences among 
Members’ respective legal systems and practices tend to be more 
important in the area of enforcement.”104 
Although the panel report emphasizes the importance of minimum 
standards, it is worth noting that the TRIPS Agreement includes 
more than just minimum standards. The Agreement also includes 
some maximum standards, as well as many built-in flexibilities which 
further facilitate the development of additional maximum standards 
in local laws. For example, Article 9.2 denies protection to “ideas, 
procedures, methods of operation or mathematical concepts as 
such.”105 Article 27.3(b) also allows for the exclusion of diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and surgical methods and plants and animals other than 
 
specific criminal standards on states. 
  In light of prevailing international law, the United States must not merely show 
that its proposed interpretation of the TRIPS Article 61 obligation is correct by 
ordinary standards. It must also persuade this panel that the parties to TRIPS agreed to 
an obligation to reform their criminal laws of such specificity that it is a sharp 
departure from the practice of every country in every other international forum that 
relates to national criminal laws. 
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶¶ 11–13. 
 101. Id. ¶ 7.497. 
 102. Id. Annex B–3, ¶ 4. As China elaborated: 
This canon holds that when a treaty standard is vague or ambiguous the Panel should 
choose the interpretation that imposes the least imposition on a country’s sovereignty. 
The Panel should choose a more intrusive interpretation only where there is clear and 
specific evidence that a more intrusive interpretation was meant. The logic behind this 
canon is that countries should not be assumed lightly to concede sovereignty. The 
Panel accordingly must find specific support for an interpretation that does involve an 
intrusive concession of sovereignty. . . . The international criminal law cited in China’s 
first written submission makes clear that this canon has particular justification in the 
realm of criminal law. 
Id. ¶¶ 4–6. 
 103. Id. ¶ 7.501. 
 104. Id. ¶ 7.513. 
 105. TRIPS Agreement art. 9.2. 
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micro-organisms from patent protection.106 
Given the existence of these maximum standards, it is no surprise 
that a growing number of commentators have now argued for the 
development of more and greater maximum standards in the 
international intellectual property regime.107 Such an approach is 
largely consistent with the position taken by the WTO panel in the 
present report. While the report emphasizes minimum standards, it 
does not foreclose any future opportunity for strengthening 
maximum standards in the TRIPS Agreement. 
B. PRIVATE RIGHTS 
The fourth recital of the preamble of the TRIPS Agreement 
explicitly recognizes that “intellectual property rights are private 
rights.”108 As a senior member of the WTO Secretariat recalled, “the 
reference to ‘private rights’ was included at the insistence of the 
Hong Kong delegation, which wanted clarification that the 
enforcement of IPRs is the responsibility of private rights holders, 
and not of governments.”109 With a population of about 7 million 
people and the size of New York City, this customs territory was 
understandably concerned about the extra resources the government 
needed to provide for prosecuting infringements of intellectual 
 
 106. Id. art. 27.3(b). 
 107. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 369, 402 (2006) (“[T]he international intellectual property regime, to some 
extent, is handicapped by its lack of maximum standards.”); Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 27 
(2004) (“[T]he WTO system must begin to recognize substantive maxima on the 
scope of available protection . . . .”); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The 
TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 58–59 (2004) (discussing how less developed 
countries can use a strategy of “regime shifting” to develop counter regime norms 
that set up maximum standards of intellectual property protection); Laurence R. 
Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 58 (2003) (noting the need to articulate “maximum 
standards of intellectual property protection” because “[t]reaties from Berne to 
Paris to TRIPS are all concerned with articulating ‘minimum standards’”); Ruth 
Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
75, 168 (2000) (proposing to develop an international fair use doctrine as a 
“ceiling”). 
 108. TRIPS Agreement pmbl. 
 109. UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 11 
n.21 (2005). 
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property rights—be they civil or criminal. Moreover, at that early 
stage of the TRIPS negotiations, the delegates had finalized neither 
Article 61, which mandates criminal enforcement,110 nor Article 58, 
which provides for optional ex officio actions.111 
Although the TRIPS preamble “draws heavily upon the two 
Ministerial Declarations which preceded the Brussels meeting, i.e. 
the Punta del Este declaration which launched the Round and the 
Mid-term Review Decision of April 1989,”112 this part of the 
preamble “was added towards the end of the negotiations.”113 As 
Carlos Correa observed: 
It is unclear why the negotiating parties included in the Preamble a 
statement about the ‘private’ nature of covered IPRs. One possible reason 
is that the TRIPS Agreement uncomfortably fits within the WTO 
framework, as it is the only multilateral agreement that deals directly with 
rights of private parties rather than with governmental measures. Another 
possible reason is the desire to make clear that Members were not obliged 
to take action ex officio, and that title-holders should bear the burden of 
exercising and defending their rights.114 
The preamble’s emphasis on the private nature of intellectual 
property rights is important, because Article 31.2 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) states 
clearly that “[t]he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise . . . its preamble and annexes.”115 Indeed, 
commentators have generally considered the preamble “an integral 
part of the agreement, a condensed expression of its underlying 
principles.”116 It is therefore understandable that the panel gave the 
 
 110. TRIPS Agreement art. 61. 
 111. Id. art. 58; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 487 (3d ed. 2008) (“Article 58 is . . . a ‘may’ 
provision . . . . Its purpose is not to impose ex officio measures . . . but to dictate a 
framework for such measures where they exist and indicate that framework 
complies with TRIPS obligations.”). 
 112. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 155. 
 113. Id. at 156. 
 114. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 10 (2007). 
 115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31.2, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added). 
 116. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 154–55; see also CORREA, supra note 114, at 
17 (“The text of the preamble is an important source of interpretation to clarify the 
meaning of treaty provisions. In fact, owing to the controversial nature of the 
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preamble due interpretative weight. 
In interpreting Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, for example, 
the present panel report makes clear that “the phrase ‘shall have the 
authority’ does not require Members to take any action in the 
absence of an application or request.”117 The panel recalled the 
preambular language in the TRIPS Agreement, which emphasizes 
the private nature of intellectual property rights.118 The panel further 
noted the use of words such as “applicant” and “request” in various 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.119 Thus, unlike the 
heightened international intellectual property enforcement standards 
that developed countries are now pushing globally through ACTA 
and other bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade agreements, the 
TRIPS Agreement—which codified internationally recognized 
minimum standards in the early 1990s120—did not require the 
 
issues covered by the TRIPS Agreement, many of its provisions are ambiguous or 
deliberately leave Members room for interpretation. The ‘context’ provided by the 
preamble becomes, hence, particularly relevant in this case.”); UNCTAD-ICTSD, 
supra note 109, at 2 (“Government officials and judges may use the preamble of a 
treaty as a source of interpretative guidance in the process of implementation and 
dispute settlement.”). 
 117. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.247. 
 118. See id. ¶ 7.530; see also Li Xuan, Ten General Misconceptions About the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 14, 27 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. 
Correa eds., 2009) (“As with any other kind of private rights, the enforcement of 
IP rights is primarily a matter concerning individual owners of these rights. It is the 
primary obligation of right-holders and not governments to enforce their claimed 
rights and take necessary legal actions for protecting their own IPR.”). 
 119. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.247 (“The 
Panel . . . observes that a common feature of Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Part III of the 
TRIPS Agreement is that the initiation of procedures under these Sections is 
generally the responsibility of private rights holders. This is reflected in the first 
sentence of Article 42 and the first sentence of Article 51, the reference to an 
‘applicant’ in Article 50.3 and 50.5, the reference to ‘request[s]’ in Articles 46 and 
48.1, and the option (not obligation) to make ex officio action available under 
Article 58.”). 
 120. See Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History 
and Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 23, 43 (Peter 
K. Yu ed., 2007) (“TRIPS adjusted the level of intellectual property protection to 
what was the highest common denominator among major industrialized countries 
as of 1991.”); see also id. at 29 (“The 1992 text was not extensively modified and 
became the basis for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 
1994.”). 
750 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
provision of ex officio authority to seize allegedly infringing 
goods.121 Indeed, Article 58 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
specifically deals with the situation where domestic laws provide for 
ex officio actions, was included only as a “may” provision.122 
The panel’s emphasis on intellectual property rights as private 
rights is particularly timely, in light of the developed countries’ 
recent demands for greater criminal enforcement, ex officio authority, 
and data exclusivity on the part of regulatory authorities. Such 
demands have gradually shifted the costs and responsibilities from 
private rights holders to national governments.123 From the 
standpoint of less developed countries, this shift is highly undesirable 
because stronger enforcement often comes with a hefty price tag and 
difficult trade-offs.124 Given the limited resources in many less 
developed countries, an increased use of resources in the 
 
 121. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 156 (noting that the fourth paragraph of 
the TRIPS preamble was added “to reaffirm that states are not, as a general rule, 
obliged to take action ex officio against violations of intellectual property rights 
(though the Agreement makes clear that in certain cases such actions must be 
available—see in particular art. 58 but also 22(3) and 23(2))”). 
 122. See id. 487 (noting that the purpose of Article 58 “is not to impose ex 
officio measures . . . but to dictate a framework for such measures where they exist 
and indicate that framework complies with TRIPS obligations”). 
 123. As Professor Correa noted: 
Criminalization is regarded by its proponents as a stronger deterrent than civil 
remedies. For right holders there are some significant advantages: actions can or must 
be initiated ex officio and the cost of procedures is fully borne by the states. However, 
it is clear that IPRs are private rights and that states’ only obligation under the TRIPS 
Agreement is to ensure that enforcement procedures are available, and not to enforce 
IPRs themselves on its own cost and responsibility. 
Carlos M. Correa, The Push for Stronger Enforcement Rules: Implications for 
Developing Countries, in ICTSD, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 27, 42 (2009) 
(footnote omitted), available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/03/fink-correa-
web.pdf; see also Li, supra note 118, at 28 (“[R]esponsibility of enforcement has 
cost implications. . . . [B]y shifting responsibility, it would shift the cost of 
enforcement from private parties to the government and ensure right-holders are 
beneficiaries without asking responsibility.”); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Re-
delineation of the Role of Stakeholders: IP Enforcement Beyond Exclusive Rights, 
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 118 at 43, 51–52 (noting the trend of “externalizing the risks and 
resources to enforce IP rights away from the originally responsible rights-holders 
towards state authorities”). 
 124. See generally Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 
WIPO J. 1 (2010). 
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enforcement area inevitably will lead to the withdrawal of resources 
from other competing, and at times more important, public needs. 
Such needs include purification of water, generation of power, 
improvement on public health, reduction of child mortality, provision 
of education, promotion of public security, building of basic 
infrastructure, reduction of violent crimes, relief of poverty, 
elimination of hunger, promotion of gender equality, protection of 
the environment, and responses to terrorism, illegal arms sales, 
human and drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and corruption.125 
 
 125. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 123, at 43 (“[I]n developing countries that 
suffer from high levels of street crime and other forms of criminality that put at 
risk the life, integrity, or freedom of persons on a daily basis, it seems reasonable 
that fighting such crimes should receive higher priority than IP-related crimes 
where protected interests are essentially of a commercial nature (except when 
associated with adulteration of health and other risky products).”); Carsten Fink, 
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Perspective, in THE GLOBAL 
DEBATE ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 123, at xiii, 2 (“Governments need to make 
choices about how many resources to spend on combating piracy, as opposed to 
enforcing other areas of law, building roads and bridges, protecting national 
security, and providing other public goods. Such choices are usually not stated in 
explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by federal and local 
governments.”); Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development Approach 
on IP Enforcement: Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra 
note 118 at 207, 210 (noting that the demands for strengthened intellectual 
property enforcement “seem to overlook the cost of the required actions, the 
different priorities that exist in developing countries regarding the use of public 
funds (health and education would normally be regarded as more urgent than IP 
enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are private rights and, hence, the 
burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by the right-holder, not the 
public at large”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development: Why Not an Agenda 
for the Developing World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 118 at 133, 143 (“Increment and 
strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably impose an economic 
burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of these countries, such 
as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Frederick M. Abbott & 
Carlos M. Correa, World Trade Organization Accession Agreements: Intellectual 
Property Issues 31 (Quaker United Nations Office, Global Economic Issues Paper 
No. 6, 2007), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Issues/ 
WTO-IP-English.pdf (“For many developing countries, protection of IPR is not, 
nor should it be, a national priority. Financial resources are better invested in 
public infrastructure projects, such as water purification and power generation.”); 
Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Munoz Tellez, The Changing Structure and 
Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 4 (South Centre, Research Paper 
No. 15, 2008), available at http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_ 
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More problematically, this shift of responsibility may ultimately 
backfire on those countries that seek to use intellectual property 
protection to attract foreign investment. For instance, strengthening 
border control requires the development of specialized expertise and 
sophistication on the part of customs authorities. If these authorities 
fail to develop the requisite expertise and sophistication, their 
inconsistent—and at times wrongful—application of new, and 
usually tougher, border measures may lead to uncertainty and 
concerns that eventually frighten away foreign investors.126 Even 
worse, the irregularities in applying these measures may become the 
subject of complaints firms register with their governments. These 
complaints, in turn, may lead to greater pressure from foreign 
governments—for example, through the notorious Section 301 
process in the United States.127 
In the end, what started as a country’s attempt to attract foreign 
investment and promote economic development ends up being a 
heavy burden on its already resource-deficient balance sheet. It is no 
wonder that the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
 
docman&task=doc_download&gid=714&Itemid=&lang=en (“Police raids and the 
use of criminal law enforcement mechanisms . . . require extensive use of public 
funds and in developing countries may entail pulling resources away from other 
law enforcement efforts when there are other means, particularly via civil law, that 
may be strengthened to allow private parties to enforce their rights and which do 
not require extensive use of public funds.”); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward 
Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play 9 
(IQsensato, Occasional Papers No. 1, 2008), available at http://www.iq 
sensato.org/wp-content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_ 
June_2008.pdf (“The opportunity costs of switching scarce resources for border 
enforcement of IP ‘crimes’ is huge. There surely are more pressing problems for 
law enforcement in developing countries than ensuring profits for OECD-based 
firms.”); Robin Gross, ACTA’s Misguided Effort to Increase Govt Spying and 
Ratchet-Up IPR Enforcement at Public Expense, IP JUST. (Mar. 21, 2008), 
http://ipjustice.org/wp/2008/03/21/acta-ipj-comments-ustr-2008march/ (“The 
financial expense to tax-payers to fund ACTA would be enormous and steal scarce 
resources away from programs that deal with genuine public needs like providing 
education and eliminating hunger. ACTA would burden the judicial system and 
divert badly needed law enforcement and customs resources away from public 
security and towards private profit.”). 
 126. See Ruse-Khan, supra note 123, at 52 (“[E]x-officio actions . . . not only 
shift the initiative and costs for taking action to the state but also entail significant 
risks of damaging claims by affected importers whenever the goods suspended in 
the end are not IP infringing.”). 
 127. See Yu, supra note 9, at 73–74. 
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recommended against this particular trend: 
[A]s state enforcement of IPRs is a resource-intensive activity, there is a 
strong case for developing countries to adopt IPR legislation that 
emphasises enforcement through a civil rather than a criminal justice 
system. . . . [W]e note that developing countries have come under 
pressure from industry which advocates enforcement regimes based on 
state initiatives for the prosecution of infringements. Such pressures 
should be resisted, and right owners assume the initiative and costs of 
enforcing their private rights.128 
It is important to remember that, although increased enforcement 
standards pose more considerable challenges to less developed 
countries as a result of their acute capacity and resource constraints, 
similar constraints affect developed countries, though to a lesser 
degree. In the United States, for example, Tim Trainer, the former 
president of the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, lamented 
how “the staff dedicated solely to IPR enforcement [in the U.S. 
government] could be counted on two hands.”129 Likewise, Chris 
Israel, the former U.S. International IPR Enforcement Coordinator, 
testified before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission that “[w]ith finite resources and seemingly infinite 
concerns, how [the United States] focus[es its] efforts is crucial.”130 
In the same public hearing, a former associate commissioner of the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration also noted his administration’s 
need to focus on getting “the best bang for the regulatory dollar . . . 
[and going] after the big time criminals.”131 Even Tim Philips, a 
 
 128. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 147 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION 
REPORT], available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ 
CIPRfullfinal.pdf. 
 129. Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property Enforcement: A Reality Gap 
(Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 47, 58 (2008). 
 130. Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: 
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 9 
(2006) (written testimony of Chris Israel, International IPR Enforcement 
Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce). 
 131. Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods: 
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 183 
(2006) (oral testimony of Peter Pitts, President, Center for Medicine in the Public 
Interest, New York). 
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staunch advocate of tough intellectual property enforcement, 
acknowledged the impossibility for the New York Police Department 
“to raid all the warehouses all of the time without swallowing the 
entire NYPD anti-counterfeiting budget and taking officers off other 
duties.”132 If developed countries face significant challenges in 
providing the resources needed to strengthen intellectual property 
enforcement, it is understandable why their less developed 
counterparts are deeply concerned about the growing demands for 
resources needed to meet high international intellectual property 
enforcement standards. 
C. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 
Article 31.3 of the Vienna Convention states that “there shall be 
taken into account, together with the context . . . any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions.”133 Drawing on this 
provision, China advanced the United States–Australia Free Trade 
Agreement as an indication of how the TRIPS delegates at the time 
of the negotiations had not yet adopted the U.S.-proposed definition 
of “commercial scale.”134 The panel, however, declined to treat such 
an agreement as a subsequent agreement within the meaning of the 
Vienna Convention.135 After all, U.S. free trade agreements are 
negotiated on a bilateral or plurilateral basis, and China is not a party 
 
 132. TIM PHILLIPS, KNOCKOFF: THE DEADLY TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS 36 
(2005). 
 133. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.3. 
 134. For example, the United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement states: 
Wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale includes: 
(i) significant wilful infringements of copyright, that have no direct or indirect 
motivation of financial gain; and 
(ii) wilful infringements for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain. 
United States–Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.1.26(a), May 
18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919. As China explained: 
There would be no reason to negotiate this definition with countries that already are 
subject to the TRIPS obligations, if the terms already had this meaning in TRIPS. On 
the contrary, the US insistence on developing a stricter definition in the bilateral 
context underscores that “commercial scale” as set forth in TRIPS is a broad concept 
that permits considerable national discretion. It is an acknowledgement that the United 
States failed to secure in the TRIPS Article 61 negotiations the obligation that it 
nonetheless seeks to impose here. 
TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, Annex B–1, ¶ 25. 
 135. See id. ¶ 7.581. 
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to any these agreements. Notwithstanding the panel’s rejection of 
China’s attempt to introduce a post-TRIPS bilateral trade agreement 
as evidence, the final outcome actually benefited not only China, but 
also other less developed countries. 
As the panel reasoned, the definition of “commercial scale” 
adopted by the negotiators in the TRIPS Agreement may be 
somewhat different from what the United States proposed (and 
adopted in its free trade agreements). For example, the panel 
reminded the United States that the country, “[i]n response to a 
question from the Panel, . . . confirmed that its own Copyright Law 
was only amended in 1997 to deal with the problem of massive 
infringement, such as via the Internet, even if the infringing activity 
is not necessarily pursued for financial gain.”136 The panel also 
“emphasize[d] that its findings should not be taken to indicate any 
view as to whether the obligation in the first sentence of Article 61 of 
the TRIPS Agreement applies to acts of counterfeiting and piracy 
committed without any purpose of financial gain.”137 To some extent, 
the panel concurred with China’s position (and that of other less 
developed countries) that, under the TRIPS Agreement, “criminal 
enforcement is required if the infringing activity is on a commercial 
scale, not if the impact of the infringing activity is on a commercial 
scale.”138 
Moreover, by rejecting the recently-negotiated bilateral, 
plurilateral, and regional trade agreements as subsequent agreements 
within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, the panel successfully 
preserved the balance of rights and obligations in the TRIPS 
Agreement. One of the main concerns among less developed 
countries is the spillover effects of bilateral, plurilateral, and regional 
trade agreements on commitments they obtained through the TRIPS 
negotiations.139 By recognizing that these newly-negotiated 
 
 136. Id. ¶ 7.660; see No Electronic Theft (Net) Act, Pub. L. No. 105–147, 111 
Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18 
U.S.C.) (amending the U.S. Copyright Act to extend criminal liability for 
copyright infringement to individuals who have not made any monetary profit 
through their infringing activities). 
 137. TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.662. 
 138. Id. Annex B–1, ¶ 33 (emphasis added). 
 139. See generally Yu, supra note 96, at 392–400 (discussing the growing use of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements to create TRIPS-plus obligations). 
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agreements do not enter the WTO framework through the backdoor, 
the panel alleviated some of the concerns over the use of these 
agreements to circumvent the multilateral process. 
Finally, the panel left open the door for less developed countries to 
challenge the inconsistency of these agreements with the TRIPS 
Agreement. The second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement stipulates that “[m]embers may, but shall not be obliged 
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required 
by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene 
the provisions of this Agreement.”140 Some member states, 
policymakers, and commentators therefore correctly read this 
provision as a ceiling that requires members not to implement more 
extensive protection than the Agreement requires if such additional 
protection would contravene the Agreement.141 As the Indian 
delegation recently noted in its intervention at the TRIPS Council: 
Although TRIPS Agreement is usually considered to be a minimum levels 
agreement, enforcement levels cannot be raised to the extent that they 
contravene TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS plus measures cannot be justified 
on the basis of Art 1:1 since the same provision also states that more 
extensive protection may only be granted “provided that such protection 
does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”. 
 In addition to laying certain minimum standards, TRIPS Agreement 
also provides ‘ceilings’, some of which are mandatory and clearly 
specified in the TRIPS Agreement. Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement has 
achieved a very careful balance of the interests of the right holders on the 
one hand, and societal interests, including development-oriented concerns 
on the other. Enforcement measures cannot be viewed in isolation of the 
Objectives contained in Art 7 . . . .142 
The position India took makes good sense. After all, “higher levels 
 
 140. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. 
 141. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to 
International Trade? ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 644, 653–57 (2011). 
 142. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights [TRIPS 
Council], Communication from India, Intervention on TRIPS plus Enforcement 
Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted in Why “IPR Enforcement” in ACTA & FTAs 
Harm the South, S. BULL., July 28, 2010, at 10–11; see also TRIPS Council, 
Minutes of June 8–9, 2010 Meeting, ¶ 265, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel6_e.htm (providing the official 
minutes of the TRIPS Council meeting). 
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of IPR protection may create barriers to legitimate trade”—a key 
concern of both the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement.143 
As far as the interpretation of Article 1.1 is concerned, its 
negotiation history should not be ignored. As Daniel Gervais 
recounted, “earlier drafts, including that of Japan and informal drafts 
in circulation before the Brussels meeting, stated unambiguously that 
the Agreement contained ‘minimum obligations.’”144 The drafts 
submitted by the European Communities and the United States, for 
example, used the negative language “nothing shall prevent 
PARTIES from [implementing TRIPs-plus measures] . . . .”145 The 
current language, however, states that “Members may, but shall not 
be obliged to” implement such measures.146 To some extent, the 
present language reflects the rare gains less developed countries 
made during the TRIPS negotiations.147 As Professor Correa 
emphatically declared: “[I]n language that seems to address 
developing countries’ concerns, [the TRIPS Agreement] explicitly 
states that no Member can be ‘obliged’ to implement in its national 
law ‘more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement.’”148 
D. LOCAL CONDITIONS 
Article 61 includes an undefined, ambiguous term “commercial 
scale.”149 To give meaning to this term, the present panel used the 
dictionary approach to indicate that the term has both qualitative and 
quantitative elements.150 While the panel could have adopted a 
 
 143. CORREA, supra note 114, at 25. 
 144. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164. 
 145. Id. 
 146. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. 
 147. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164 (“[I]t could be said that para.1 
indirectly emphasises the fact that the Agreement did not achieve all that some 
countries wished.”). 
 148. CORREA, supra note 114, at 24 (citing TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1). 
 149. TRIPS Agreement art. 61. 
 150. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.538. As the panel 
elaborated: 
[T]he combination of that definition of “commercial” with the definition of “scale” 
presents a problem in that scale is a quantitative concept whilst commercial is 
qualitative, in the sense that it refers to the nature of certain acts. Some acts are in fact 
commercial, whilst others are not. Any act of selling can be described as commercial 
in this primary sense, irrespective of its size or value. If “commercial” is simply read 
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universal definition of “commercial scale” that mirrors the TRIPS 
Agreement’s one-size-fits-all approach, it wisely decided otherwise. 
Instead, the panel report states that the term “commercial scale” 
provides “a relative standard, which will vary when applied to 
different fact situations.”151 Because “counterfeiting or piracy ‘on a 
commercial scale’ refers to counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the 
magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity with 
respect to a given product in a given market,”152 the panel had to look 
to specific conditions in China’s marketplace to determine whether 
its criminal thresholds have violated the TRIPS Agreement.153 
While the panel’s willingness to appreciate local conditions is 
highly welcome, it also signals some challenges for future 
complainants. In the present dispute, for example, the market 
conditions are highly complex. The Chinese market is notoriously 
“fragmented and characterized by a profusion of small 
manufacturers, middlemen, distributors, and small outlets at the retail 
level.”154 As the United States elaborated in its first written 
 
as a qualitative term, referring to all acts pertaining to, or bearing on commerce, this 
would read the word “scale” out of the text. Acts on a commercial scale would simply 
be commercial acts. The phrase “on a commercial scale” would simply mean 
“commercial”. Such an interpretation fails to give meaning to all the terms used in the 
treaty and is inconsistent with the rule of effective treaty interpretation. 
  There are no other uses of the word “scale” in the TRIPS Agreement, besides the 
first and fourth sentences of Article 61. However, the wider context shows that the 
TRIPS Agreement frequently uses the word “commercial” with many other nouns, 
although nowhere else with “scale”. The other uses of the word “commercial” include 
“commercial rental”, “commercial purposes”, “commercial exploitation”, “commercial 
terms”, “public non-commercial use”, “first commercial exploitation”, “honest 
commercial practices”, “commercial value”, “unfair commercial use”, “non-
commercial nature” and “legitimate commercial interests”. 
Id. ¶¶ 7.538–7.539 (footnotes omitted). 
 151. Id. ¶ 7.600. 
 152. Id. ¶ 7.577. 
 153. See id. ¶ 7.604 (“The parties agree that the standard of ‘a commercial scale’ 
will vary by product and market and that the conformity of China’s criminal 
thresholds with that standard must be assessed by reference to China’s 
marketplace.”). 
 154. Id. ¶ 7.615; see also Responses by the United States of America to the 
Questions by the Panel to the Parties, China—Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 41 n.20, WT/DS362/1 (May 5, 
2007) (“Although the Chinese retail market is huge, it is extremely fragmented, 
with no dominant organized players. The top 10 retailers hold less than 2 percent 
of the market, and the top 100 retailers have less than 6.4 percent.” (quoting A.T. 
KEARNEY, THE 2005 GLOBAL RETAIL DEVELOPMENT INDEX: DESTINATION CHINA 
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submission: 
[A] single wholesale mall in Yiwu, China houses some 30,000 stores, 
many of them in small 10-by-15 foot stalls. Retail establishments come in 
many different sizes and are widely dispersed across China. Another 
shopping mall in Luohu Commercial City spans six floors of small stores 
and offers “counterfeit goods at bargain prices.” In spite of the recent 
growth of large retailers in China, much retail commerce appears to still 
be conducted through small outlets, and consequently beyond the reach of 
criminal sanctions due to the criminal thresholds.155 
To some extent, one could wonder whether the TRIPS delegates 
anticipated this type of highly fragmented markets when they 
negotiated the specific language in Article 61. 
Notwithstanding the challenge in collecting information about 
market conditions, the present panel insisted on obtaining 
authoritative information specific to the local markets, such as 
information on pricing and market structures.156 The panel’s 
requirements of this type of evidence not only benefit less developed 
countries in the WTO process, but also provide a major boost to the 
growing demands for empirical studies or impact assessments on the 
push for greater intellectual property protection and enforcement. 
After all, international organizations, policymakers, and 
commentators have already widely endorsed such assessments in the 
areas of human rights, public health, and biological diversity.157 
 
(2005), available at http://www.atkearney.com/index.php/ Publications/the-2005-
global-retail-development-index-destination-china.html)). 
 155. First Submission of the United States of America, China—Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 122, 
WT/DS362/1 (Jan. 30, 2008) (footnote omitted). 
 156. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.629 (stating that 
the information contained in the press articles submitted by the United States was 
“inadequate to demonstrate what is typical or usual in China for the purposes of the 
relevant treaty obligation”); id. ¶ 7.630 (“[I]t can be noted that more specific 
information on prices and markets in China is contained in various US exhibits, 
notably information on prices of products in a report on Cinema and Home 
Entertainment in China prepared by Screen Digest and Nielsen NRG . . . and in 
annexes to a letter from Nintendo of America to the United States Trade 
Representative.” (footnote omitted)). 
 157. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992, 
1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (requiring contracting parties to “introduce appropriate 
procedures requiring environmental impact assessment of its proposed projects that 
are likely to have significant adverse effects on biological diversity with a view to 
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Moreover, the panel’s push for an evidence-based approach is 
highly important from the standpoint of future development of 
internationally recognized intellectual property standards. As the 
U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights reminded us, the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights is “a means 
to an end, not an end in itself.”158 These rights, therefore, should not 
be developed based on a mere leap of faith. By focusing on the need 
to appreciate local conditions and by taking an evidence-based 
approach, the panel report helps slow down the ongoing push for 
one-size-fits-all—or more precisely, super-size-fits-all—standards 
through the TRIPS Agreement and other international instruments. It 
also reflects the fact that intellectual property rights, though an 
important policy tool, form only part of a larger innovation system. 
E. SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE 
Relating to the previous point, and even better from the standpoint 
of less developed countries, the present panel demanded substantive, 
as opposed to anecdotal, evidence. As mentioned earlier, the panel 
report rejects the use of allegations in nonauthoritative press articles 
or highly aggregated data in consultant and industry reports.159 The 
panel’s demand for substantive evidence is not limited to the United 
States. It is consistent throughout the panel proceedings. 
With respect to the first claim on censorship, for example, the 
 
avoiding or minimizing such effects and, where appropriate, allow for public 
participation in such procedures”); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., 
Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to 
Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from Any 
Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He Is the Author (Article 15, 
Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 12, 2006) 
(“States parties should . . . consider undertaking human rights impact assessments 
prior to the adoption and after a period of implementation of legislation for the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, 
literary or artistic productions.”); WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, 
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 10 
(2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ 
ENPublicHealthReport.pdf (“Health policies, as well as inter alia those addressing 
trade, the environment and commerce, should be equally subject to assessments as 
to their impact on the right to health.”). 
 158. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 128, at 6. 
 159. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.629. 
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panel made equal demands for substantive evidence—this time from 
China. Although China’s efforts to ban immoral and politically-
sensitive works are well-known and have been widely documented, 
the panel refused to take “judicial notice” of censorship in China.160 
Instead, the panel expected China to substantiate its assertion that 
rights holders will obtain greater protection through censorship 
regulations than copyright law—just like its later demand for 
evidence from the United States concerning the criminal threshold 
claim.161 
Likewise, the panel demanded substantive evidence when China 
defended its criminal thresholds by pointing out that Chinese 
criminal law allows for private prosecution.162 As China claimed, 
“defining a crime with too low a threshold ‘could unleash a large 
volume of private enforcement actions and impose a significant 
burden on the judicial system.’”163 Although the panel did not reject 
China’s concern outright, it pointed out China’s failure to 
substantiate such a concern. As the panel maintained, China “lacked 
any data relevant to its experience after it lowered thresholds for the 
crimes infringing intellectual property crimes in 2004.”164 Without 
the needed substantive evidence, the panel did not consider China’s 
claim further. 
In the intellectual property context, the panel’s emphasis on 
authoritative substantive evidence is highly important. To date, much 
of the data used in media and government reports is supplied by self-
 
 160. The panel’s approach contrasts strongly with the preference of some U.S. 
policymakers. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported 
Counterfeit Goods: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 
109th Cong. 73 (2006) (remarks of Commissioner Patrick Mulloy) (“Maybe [the 
United States] could ask the court at the WTO to take judicial notice because 
sometimes you can ask a court to do that, and based on what the WTO itself has 
said about China, I don’t understand why there is this enormous rock to lift up this 
hill when everybody knows and will say it’s going on.”). 
 161. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.137 (“China 
maintains that public censorship renders private enforcement unnecessary, that it 
enforces prohibitions on content seriously, and that this removes banned content 
from the public domain more securely than would be possible through copyright 
enforcement. The Panel notes that these assertions, even if they were relevant, are 
not substantiated.” (footnote omitted)). 
 162. See id. ¶ 7.598 (quoting China’s first written submission). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
762 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:3 
interested trade groups.165 They are highly suspect, and 
policymakers, commentators, and academics have widely questioned 
their accuracy. Consider, for example, the figures supplied by the 
Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) in its effort to document global 
piracy rates.166 A draft Australian government report described these 
statistics “as a ‘self-serving hyperbole’ [that is] ‘unverified and 
epistemologically unreliable.’”167 Likewise, Gary Shapiro, the 
president of the Consumer Electronics Association, called these 
figures “absurd on [their] face” and “patently obscene.”168 Ivan Png 
further demonstrated that the BSA’s change of consultants had led to 
a change in methodology for measurement, which in turn resulted in 
systematic effects on published piracy rates.169 Among the widely 
criticized flaws of the BSA studies are the highly incredulous one-to-
one substitution rate between legal and infringing goods,170 the 
overvaluation of pirated and counterfeit goods,171 and the failure to 
recognize the existence of a wide variety of offsetting welfare 
benefits.172 
 
 165. The lack of independently verified evidence is due in part to the practical 
challenges to collecting data about illicit activities. See ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68 (1990); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
COUNTERFEIT AND PIRATED GOODS 16–17 (2010) [hereinafter GAO STUDY]. 
 166. See BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE & INT’L DATA CORP., SEVENTH ANNUAL 
BSA/IDC GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY (2010) available at 
http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2009/studies/09_Piracy_Study_Report_A4_final_
111010.pdf. 
 167. Li, supra note 118, at 25. 
 168. Software Piracy: BSA or Just BS?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 93. 
 169. See I.P.L. Png, On the Reliability of Software Piracy Statistics, 9 ELEC. 
COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 365, 365 (2010). 
 170. See GAO STUDY, supra note 165, at 17. As Carsten Fink observed in an 
issue paper he wrote before joining WIPO as its first-ever chief economist: 
[BSA’s assumption] that, in the absence of piracy, all consumers of pirated software 
would switch to legitimate copies at their current prices . . . is unrealistic—especially 
in developing countries where low incomes would likely imply that many consumers 
would not demand any legitimate software at all. Accordingly, estimated revenue 
losses by software producers are bound to be overestimated. 
Fink, supra note 125, at 13. 
 171. See GAO STUDY, supra note 165, at 17–18. 
 172. As the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) pointed out in its 
recent study, although piracy and counterfeiting may affect the core intellectual 
property industries, these industries, along with those in other sectors and 
individual consumers, may have obtained offsetting benefits. Id. at 15. As stated in 
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To be certain, substantive evidence is costly to collect. The 
demand for such evidence, therefore, can make it difficult for less 
developed countries to bring forth WTO claims. Nevertheless, 
because less developed countries, until recently, have always 
participated in the dispute settlement process as respondents,173 the 
DSB’s demand for the production of substantive evidence on local 
conditions actually may favor less developed countries more than it 
harms them. 
F. HOPE AND ENCOURAGEMENT 
The present panel report gives hope and encouragement to less 
developed countries, which have become more frequent users of the 
WTO dispute settlement process in recent years.174 It is important to 
 
the study: 
[C]onsumers may use pirated goods to “sample” music, movies, software, or electronic 
games before purchasing legitimate copies, which may lead to increased sales of 
legitimate goods. In addition, industries with products that are characterized by large 
“switching costs,” may also benefit from piracy due to lock-in effects. . . . [Moreover,] 
companies that experience revenue losses in one line of business—such as movies—
may . . . increase revenues in related or complementary businesses due to increased 
brand awareness. For instance, companies may experience increased revenues due to 
the sales of merchandise that are based on movie characters whose popularity is 
enhanced by sales of pirated movies. One expert also observed that some industries 
may experience an increase in demand for their products because of piracy in other 
industries. This expert identified Internet infrastructure manufacturers (e.g., companies 
that make routers) as possible beneficiaries of digital piracy, because of the bandwidth 
demands related to the transfer of pirated digital content. While competitive pressure 
to keep one step ahead of counterfeiters may spur innovation in some cases, some of 
this innovation may be oriented toward anticounterfeiting and antipiracy efforts, rather 
than enhancing the product for consumers. 
Id. Although the GAO study did not go further, one could easily question how 
much of the losses the intellectual property industries claimed to have suffered 
would be cancelled out by these benefits. If the benefits indeed outweigh the 
claimed losses, the country will have a net economic gain even though the core 
intellectual property industries may have suffered losses. 
 173. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting 
Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 941 fig. 2 
(2006). 
 174. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten 
Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 24 (2005) (noting that “the US and the EC no longer 
were as dominant as complainants in the system” and that “developing country use 
of the system increased dramatically” in the second half of the first decade of 
operation of the WTO dispute settlement process); see also David Evans & 
Gregory C. Shaffer, Introduction to DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPERIENCE 1, 2 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo 
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remember that China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights is only the second 
TRIPS-related dispute involving a developing country that focuses 
primarily on the TRIPS Agreement and results in the release of a 
WTO panel report.175 In the first dispute, the United States and later 
the European Communities successfully challenged, through parallel 
proceedings, India’s failure to establish a mailbox system in its 
patent law pursuant to Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement.176 The 
result was a clear-cut victory for the United States and the European 
Communities. 
In this second dispute, however, the result was mixed. Even in an 
area where developed countries have historically dominated—
intellectual property protection and enforcement—developing 
countries are now doing much better in the WTO dispute settlement 
process than they did in the early days of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
benefits of this process, indeed, have begun to trickle down to less 
developed countries. 
Most recently, India and Brazil filed complaints against the 
European Union and the Netherlands over the repeated seizure of in-
transit generic drugs.177 Although it remains to be seen whether either 
 
Meléndez-Ortiz eds., 2010) (observing that “no African country has ever initiated a 
[WTO] dispute” and that “only one Least Developed Country . . . initiated a 
dispute, and that dispute did not progress beyond the consultation phase 
(Bangladesh)”). 
 175. The U.S.-China dispute is actually the third one involving the TRIPS 
Agreement. Articles 3, 20 and 65 were implicated in Indonesia—Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry. See Panel Report, Indonesia—Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automobile Industry pt. XI, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, 
WT/DS64/R (July 2, 1998). That dispute, however, did not focus primarily on the 
TRIPS Agreement. Rather, it also covered GATT, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. Out of all the complainants, only the United States claimed that 
Indonesia had violated the TRIPS Agreement. See Request for Consultations by 
the United States, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
WT/DS59/1 (Oct. 15, 1996). 
 176. See Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, 
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998). 
 177. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member 
State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) 
[hereinafter Request for Consultations by India]; see Request for Consultations by 
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of these two countries will become the first developing countries to 
have a complaint resulting in the establishment of a WTO panel, the 
European Union’s recent agreement with India178 to amend its 
regulation on customs border measures179 already suggests the 
growing ability of less developed countries to take advantage of the 
WTO dispute settlement process. Moreover, even if India ultimately 
settles with the European Union, the dispute between the Brazil and 
the European Union could still remain. 
III. DISAPPOINTMENTS 
Notwithstanding the many important points scored by less 
developed countries in the panel’s interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the panel report provides these countries with some 
disappointments. For illustration purposes, this Part focuses on the 
interpretation of four TRIPS provisions that are of particular 
importance to less developed countries: (1) Article 1.1; (2) Articles 7 
and 8; and (3) Article 41.5. All of these provisions memorialize the 
hard-fought bargains less developed countries have won through the 
TRIPS negotiations.180 This Part begins by discussing the panel 
report’s biggest disappointment: the lack of discussion of Articles 7 
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. It then examines the WTO panel’s 
treatment of Articles 1.1 and 41.5. 
A. ARTICLES 7 AND 8 
The biggest disappointment in the panel report concerns its failure 
to discuss Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 7, which 
 
Brazil, European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in 
Transit, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by 
Brazil]. 
 178. See India-EU Generic Drug Row ‘Resolved’ at Brussels Summit, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 10, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11971568. 
 179. See Council Regulation 1383/2003, Concerning Customs Actions Against 
Goods Suspected of Infringing Certain Intellectual Property Rights, 2003 O.J. (L 
196) 7 (EC). 
 180. See Gervais, supra note 120, at 30 (“The only true measures they obtained 
(in addition to articles 7 and 8) were transitional periods to implement the 
Agreement.”); Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1023 (2009) (stating that articles 7 and 8 are 
“the very few provisions” taken from the B text advanced by less developed 
countries). 
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delineates the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement, provides: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.181 
Article 8, which sets forth the normative principles, provides: 
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, 
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to 
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures 
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.182 
Although some commentators have considered Article 7 as “mere 
hortatory”183 and highlighted the limitations of Article 8—especially 
its TRIPS-consistency test184—these provisions are paramount to the 
 
 181. TRIPS Agreement art. 7. 
 182. Id. art. 8. 
 183. See CORREA, supra note 114, at 93 (“Some observers have read ‘should’ to 
mean that Article 7 is a mere hortary [sic] provision, the interpretative value of 
which is equivalent to that of any preambular provision.”); JACQUES J. GORLIN, AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE WTO TRIPS 
(INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT 16 (1999) (stating that “according to 
United States and EC negotiators, the language of Article 7 is hortatory and does 
not have any operational significance” and that Article 8 “was viewed by 
developed country negotiators throughout most of the negotiations as being non-
operational and hortatory” (citing interviews with Mike Kirk and Peter Carl)); 
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2821, 2843 (2006) (“The language referencing development in TRIPS is 
not mandatory, but rather hortatory . . . .”). 
 184. As Daniel Gervais noted: 
Both [Paragraphs of Article 8] are limited by the use of the phrase “consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement” . . . . Given the phrase added by negotiators, it would be 
difficult to justify an exception not foreseen under the Agreement, unless it is an 
exception to a right not protected under other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement or 
those of other international instruments incorporated in TRIPS. 
GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 121–22. See generally Yu, supra note 180, at 1008–
18 (discussing Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
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correct interpretation of the Agreement. Article 31.1 of the Vienna 
Convention states specifically that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty . . . in the light of its object and purpose.”185 
Because Articles 7 and 8 were included in the text of the TRIPS 
Agreement, they should be given greater weight than the preambular 
provisions discussed in Part II.B. Notably, the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration has singled out these two provisions for their special 
importance.186 It stated explicitly that the work of the TRIPS Council 
“shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in articles 7 
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the 
development dimension.”187 
Since the entering into effect of the TRIPS Agreement, 
commentators have noted the importance of Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement and how these development-friendly safeguard 
provisions can be interpreted to strengthen the position of less 
developed countries. For example, Jerome Reichman observed: 
[Developing] countries could attempt to trigger the safeguards implicit in 
Articles 7 and 8 in one of two ways. The least destructive approach would 
be to convince the Council for TRIPS itself to recommend narrowly 
described waivers to meet specified circumstances for a limited period of 
time. This approach would strengthen the mediatory powers of the 
Council for TRIPS and help to offset the problems arising from the 
inability of that body to quash or stay requests for consultations and 
dispute-settlement panels launched by trigger-happy governments. 
 Alternatively, developing country defendants responding to complaints 
of nullification and impairment under Article 64 might invoke the 
application of Articles 7 and 8(1) to meet unforeseen conditions of 
hardship. This defense, if properly grounded and supported by factual 
evidence, could persuade the Appellate Body either to admit the existence 
of a tacit doctrine of frustration built into the aforementioned articles or to 
buttress those articles by reaching out to the general doctrine of frustration 
recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Either way, 
overly aggressive complainants could wind up with what would amount 
 
 185. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.1 (emphasis added). 
 186. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 211 (noting that Articles 7 and 8 “were 
singled out as having a special importance in para. 19 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration”). 
 187. Doha Declaration, supra note 95, ¶ 19. 
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to a judicially imposed waiver.188 
In the copyright context, Ruth Okediji described how Articles 7 and 
8 can be used to justify the validity of the fair use privilege under the 
TRIPS Agreement.189 Srividhya Ragavan also explored the use of the 
provisions to determine whether a member state has provided an 
effective sui generis system to protect plant varieties.190 
In a recent article, I further discussed the five different ways of 
using Articles 7 and 8 to facilitate a more flexible interpretation and 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement: 
(1) as a guiding light for interpretation and implementation; (2) as a shield 
against aggressive demands for increased intellectual property protection; 
(3) as a sword to challenge provisions that overprotect intellectual 
property rights or tolerate their abuse; (4) as a bridge to connect the 
TRIPS regime with other intellectual property or related international 
regimes; and (5) as a seed for the development of new international 
intellectual property norms.191 
Although WTO panel reports have applied Articles 7 and 8 on 
occasion, their application has remained limited, and the two 
provisions deserve greater attention from both the DSB and members 
participating in the WTO dispute settlement process. After all, these 
two provisions can influence the development of the international 
intellectual property regime in many different ways: 
Legally, the two provisions play important roles in the interpretation and 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Economically, they facilitate 
innovation, technology transfer, and knowledge production while at the 
same time promoting social and economic welfare and development 
goals. Politically, they provide the much-needed balance to make the 
Agreement a legitimate bargain between developed and less-developed 
 
 188. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or 
Cooperation with the Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441, 
461–62 (2000). 
 189. See Okediji, supra note 107, at 167–68. But see GERVAIS, supra note 111, 
at 207 (stating that “it is unclear whether art.7 could be used to ‘stretch’ art.13 (or 
other ‘exceptions’ articles) as much as would be necessary to cover certain forms 
of fair use, including reverse engineering (decompilation) and parody”). 
 190. See Srividhya Ragavan & Jamie Mayer O’Shields, Has India Addressed Its 
Farmers’ Woes? A Story of Plant Protection Issues, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
97, 101 (2007). 
 191. Yu, supra note 180, at 982. 
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countries. Structurally, the two provisions bridge the gap between the 
TRIPS regime and other international regimes. Globally, they have sowed 
the seeds for the development of new international norms both within and 
without the TRIPS regime.192 
Notwithstanding the importance of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Vienna Convention’s explicit stipulation that a 
treaty be interpreted in good faith “in the light of its object and 
purpose,”193 the WTO panel in the U.S.-China dispute did not 
mention Article 7 or 8 even once. Nor did it mention anything about 
the objectives or the principles of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The panel’s approach contrasts significantly with that of Canada—
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products.194 In that dispute, the 
European Communities challenged the regulatory review and 
stockpiling exceptions in Canadian patent law as violative of the 
TRIPS Agreement. In response, Canada drew attention to Articles 7 
and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and contended that these provisions 
“call for a liberal interpretation of the three conditions stated in 
Article 30 of the Agreement, so that governments would have the 
necessary flexibility to adjust patent rights to maintain the desired 
balance with other important national policies.”195 As the WTO panel 
recounted: 
In the view of Canada, [the clause “in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations” in] Article 
7 . . . declares that one of the key goals of the TRIPS Agreement was a 
balance between the intellectual property rights created by the Agreement 
and other important socio-economic policies of WTO Member 
governments. Article 8 elaborates the socio-economic policies in 
question, with particular attention to health and nutritional policies.196 
Although the European Communities “did not dispute the stated 
goal of achieving a balance within the intellectual property rights 
system between important national policies,”197 it took a very 
 
 192. Id. at 1046. 
 193. Vienna Convention, supra note 115, art. 31.1. 
 194. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000). 
 195. Id. ¶ 7.24. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. ¶ 7.25. 
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different view of Articles 7 and 8. As the Panel continued: 
In the view of the EC, Articles 7 and 8 are statements that describe the 
balancing of goals that had already taken place in negotiating the final 
texts of the TRIPS Agreement. According to the EC, to view Article 30 as 
an authorization for governments to “renegotiate” the overall balance of 
the Agreement would involve a double counting of such socio-economic 
policies. In particular, the EC pointed to the last phrase of Article 8.1 
requiring that government measures to protect important socio-economic 
policies be consistent with the obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. The 
EC also referred to the provisions of first consideration of the Preamble 
and Article 1.1 as demonstrating that the basic purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement was to lay down minimum requirements for the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.198 
In the end, the Panel found Canada’s position a little more 
convincing, and struck a compromise between the two positions by 
allowing for “certain adjustments” that stopped short of renegotiating 
the basic balance of the TRIPS Agreement. As the panel declared: 
Article 30’s very existence amounts to a recognition that the definition of 
patent rights contained in Article 28 would need certain adjustments. On 
the other hand, the three limiting conditions attached to Article 30 testify 
strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to 
bring about what would be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic 
balance of the Agreement. Obviously, the exact scope of Article 30’s 
authority will depend on the specific meaning given to its limiting 
conditions. The words of those conditions must be examined with 
particular care on this point. Both the goals and the limitations stated in 
Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when doing so as well 
as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its 
object and purposes.199 
Although the panel underscored the need to take account of the goals 
and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1, it “avoided 
elaboration of the content and implications of [these provisions], 
despite the specific reference that the parties made thereto in their 
submissions.”200 
Since Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
the DSB—whether through the Appellate Body or a WTO panel—
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. ¶ 7.26. 
 200. CORREA, supra note 114, at 102. 
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has not provided any further interpretation and application of 
Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.201 In Canada—Term of 
Patent Protection, the Appellate Body explicitly acknowledged that 
the DSB had yet to determine “the applicability of Article 7 or 
Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement in possible future cases with 
respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO 
Members that are set out in those Articles.”202 In its view, the two 
provisions “still await appropriate interpretation.”203 
In light of the provisions’ strong potential, yet limited 
development, the lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 in China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights is therefore rather disappointing. This panel report 
could have been an ideal dispute for the DSB to elaborate on the 
content, meaning, and implications of Articles 7 and 8—two 
provisions that are likely to provide important safeguards for less 
developed countries in the WTO framework. To a great extent, these 
countries missed a rare opportunity to establish further a pro-
development interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. 
In all fairness to the WTO panel, none of the parties—be it China, 
the United States, or any of the twelve third parties—mentioned 
Articles 7 and 8 in its submissions. Given the design and structure of 
the WTO dispute settlement process, the WTO panel is unlikely to 
include in its report an argument not raised by any of the parties. The 
lost opportunity, therefore, can be somewhat attributed to both China 
and the developing country third parties. The positions taken by 
these countries contrast significantly with the position India recently 
took in European Union and a Member State—Seizure of Generic 
Drugs in Transit.204 In its complaint, India reminded the DSB that 
“the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement referred to above must be 
interpreted and implemented in light of the objectives and principles 
 
 201. See Denis Borges Barbosa et al., Slouching Towards Development in 
International Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 98 (“The balancing 
role of articles 7 and 8 has not received full support in the WTO case law. The 
WTO Appellate Body analysis in . . . Canada—Patent Protection of 
Pharmaceutical Products . . . is not definitive . . . .”). 
 202. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Term of Patent Protection, ¶ 101, 
WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 177, at 3. 
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set forth in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.”205 
In sum, the lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 in the present 
panel report provides an important lesson for all less developed 
countries. If these two provisions are to provide the key basis for a 
pro-development interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, they need 
to be utilized to the fullest extent in the WTO submissions to help 
develop or clarify their normative content. By further developing 
Articles 7 and 8, countries can also “pave[] the way for the 
development of future exceptions and limitations, which can be used 
to restore the balance of the international intellectual property 
system.”206 The greater use of the two provisions may even help 
“persuade the [DSB] to recognize and give effect to developmental 
priorities.”207 
B. ARTICLE 1.1 
The third sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
provides: “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within 
their own legal system and practice.”208 It echoes the Agreement’s 
preamble, which recognizes “the special needs of the least-developed 
country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to 
create a sound and viable technological base.”209 
Notably, the third sentence of Article 1.1 did not come from the 
developed countries’ original proposal. As Professor Gervais 
recounted: 
[W]hile, in their draft texts, the EC and the United States had suggested a 
 
 205. Id. Notably, Brazil did not mention in its complaint Articles 7 and 8 of the 
TRIPS Agreement. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 177. 
 206. Yu, supra note 180, at 1007; accord J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to 
Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 11, 35 (1997) (stating that the safeguard provisions implicit in the 
objectives set out in Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement and the public interest 
exceptions expressly recognized in Article 8 “may legitimize ad hoc exceptions 
and limitations required by overriding national development needs or for reasons 
of national health, welfare or security”). 
 207. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 130. 
 208. TRIPS Agreement art. 1.1. 
 209. Id. pmbl. 
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provision according to which countries would “provide for the protection 
of intellectual property rights under their domestic law and practice in 
accordance with [the provision of TRIPS]”, the final text uses similar 
words to recognise the flexibility of countries implementing TRIPS vis-à-
vis their legal systems and practices.210 
Instead, the sentence reflects in part the fairly detailed intervention 
India made during the July 1989 meeting of the TRIPS Negotiating 
Group, as well as the expectation of many less developed 
countries.211 As the GATT Secretariat recounted: 
[The Indian delegate] emphasised that any discussion on the intellectual 
property system should keep in perspective that the essence of the system 
was its monopolistic and restrictive character. This had special 
implications for developing countries, because more than 99 per cent of 
the world’s stock of patents was owned by the nationals of the 
industrialised countries. Recognising the extraordinary rights granted by 
the system and their implications, international conventions on this 
subject incorporated, as a central philosophy, the freedom of member 
States to attune their intellectual property protection system to their own 
needs and conditions. This freedom of host countries should be 
recognised as a fundamental principle and should guide all of the 
discussions in the Negotiating Group.212 
It is, therefore, no surprise that China described Article 1.1, along 
with Article 41.5, as a “key concession[] to the developing world.”213 
In the present dispute, China invoked Article 1.1 in its response to 
the United States’ complaint over China’s use of criminal thresholds. 
As China claimed, this provision laid down “a specific ‘caveat’ that 
establishes boundaries on obligations, specifically in the realm of 
enforcement.”214 The provision not only provided the much-needed 
 
 210. GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 164. 
 211. See Yu, supra note 180, at 987–89 (discussing India’s intervention). 
 212. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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 214. Id. ¶ 7.511. 
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context for interpreting the TRIPS Agreement,215 but also indicated 
that “the balance of rights and obligations in TRIPS is . . . very much 
at stake in this dispute.”216 
After careful review, however, the WTO panel rejected China’s 
position. As it declared, Article 1.1 “does not permit differences in 
domestic legal systems and practices to justify any derogation from 
the basic obligation to give effect to the provisions on 
enforcement.”217 Instead of allowing a member state to lower the 
specified TRIPS standards, the provision merely grants to a WTO 
member “freedom to determine the appropriate method of 
implementation of the provisions to which they are required to give 
effect.”218 
Although the panel’s interpretation of Article 1.1 was 
disappointing for many less developed countries, such interpretation 
was consistent with that found in the reports of the Appellate Body 
or other WTO panels. In all of these reports, no respondent has ever 
succeeded in using the third sentence of Article 1.1 to defend its 
measures against non-compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. In 
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products, for example, India was found to have violated 
Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement despite mounting a 
defense based in part on Article 1.1.219 Although the Appellate Body 
was reluctant to “second guess national governments and decide 
what is appropriate within a particular legal ‘system and practice,’”220 
it refused to allow India to determine by itself whether the country’s 
implementation was consistent with the WTO. As the Appellate 
Body explained: 
 
 215. See id.; see also id. Annex B–2, ¶ 15 (“During the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, developing countries objected strenuously to new enforcement 
obligations that would prescribe rigid standards and would ignore principles of 
sovereignty. Developing countries prevailed, over opposition from the United 
States and others, on the inclusion of both Article 1.1 and Article 41.5.”). 
 216. Id. Annex B–2, ¶ 2. 
 217. Id. ¶ 7.513. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Panel Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997); Panel Report, 
India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998). 
 220. CORREA, supra note 114, at 28. 
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[T]he Panel was simply performing its task in determining whether 
India’s “administrative instructions” for receiving mailbox applications 
were in conformity with India’s obligations under Article 70.8(a) of the 
TRIPS Agreement. It is clear that an examination of the relevant aspects 
of Indian municipal law and, in particular, the relevant provisions of the 
Patents Act as they relate to the “administrative instructions”, is essential 
to determining whether India has complied with its obligations under 
Article 70.8(a). There was simply no way for the Panel to make this 
determination without engaging in an examination of Indian law. But . . . 
the Panel was not interpreting Indian law “as such”; rather, the Panel was 
examining Indian law solely for the purpose of determining whether India 
had met its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. To say that the Panel 
should have done otherwise would be to say that only India can assess 
whether Indian law is consistent with India’s obligations under the WTO 
Agreement. This, clearly, cannot be so.221 
Thus, even with the safeguard created by the third sentence of Article 
1.1, the Appellate Body made it clear that “[t]he freedom preserved 
by [the provision] cannot be seen . . . as a blank cheque for Members 
to decide by themselves whether they have complied or not with 
their obligations.”222 Instead, the legislation of each member state is 
subject to review by the DSB. 
Likewise, in United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, where the United States asserted Article 1.1 as part of its 
defense, the panel declared that “while the WTO Members are free to 
choose the method of implementation, the minimum standards of 
protection are the same for all of them.”223 That dispute concerned 
the European Communities’ challenge of Section 110(5) of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, which enables some restaurants and small 
establishments to play copyrighted music without compensating 
copyright holders.224 Although the United States defended that the 
 
 221. Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 66, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997). 
 222. CORREA, supra note 114, at 28; accord UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, 
at 28 (“[The] freedom to determine appropriate method is not the equivalent of a 
right to self-certify compliance with TRIPS obligations. Compliance requires 
demonstration of a legally sound basis of implementation.”). 
 223. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act,  
¶ 6.189, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5) Panel Report]. 
 224. For discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The 
Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of 
Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on 
a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music 
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exemptions were valid under the three-step test as laid out in Article 
13 of the TRIPS Agreement, the panel found the business exemption 
within the provision inconsistent with Articles 11bis(1)(iii) and 
11(1)(ii) of the Berne Convention as incorporated into the TRIPS 
Agreement.225 
In the end, an arbitration proceeding determined that the United 
States owed the complainant an annual compensation of 
€1,219,900.226 While the United States paid the European Union $3.3 
million more than a year later,227 it disappointingly had neither 
updated its statute to ensure compliance with the TRIPS Agreement 
nor made a second payment. To date, this dispute remains one of the 
two cases involving the TRIPS Agreement where the respondent 
remains in noncompliance with the panel report.228 
Given the dismal track record in using the third sentence of Article 
1.1, it is fair to assume that its future use is unlikely to provide any 
effective defense against TRIPS noncompliance, even though WTO 
members may still be tempted to include such a sentence in their oral 
statements or written submissions. To a great extent, the WTO 
members’ duty to interpret international agreements in good faith 
(pacta sunt servanda) has largely constrained the interpretation of 
the third sentence of Article 1.1.229 The sentence’s limited effect is 
similar to that of the first sentence of Article 1.1, which requires 
WTO members to “give effect to the provisions of this 
 
Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000). 
 225. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 223, ¶ 7.1. 
 226. See Award of the Arbitrators, United States—Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act: Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, ¶ 5.1, 
WT/DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001). 
 227. See Yu, supra note 173, at 940 n.196. 
 228. See Pauwelyn, supra note 39, at 417. The other dispute involving a 
noncompliant respondent is also one where the United States served as the 
respondent. United States—Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 
involved the prohibition of registration or renewal of trademarks previously 
abandoned by trademark holders whose business and assets have been confiscated 
under Cuban law. See Section 211 Panel Report, supra note 6. 
 229. See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 26 (“There are limits to TRIPS 
Agreement flexibility in the sense that its rules cannot be stretched beyond 
reasonable good faith interpretation.”); see also Vienna Convention, supra note 
115, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 321 (1987) (“[E]very international agreement in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”). 
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Agreement.”230 Apart from the fact that the two sentences cancel 
each other out, neither provision adds anything substantive to the 
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement—other than what public 
international law already provides. 
Disturbingly, the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) recently 
suggested that similar language in ACTA might provide the country 
with an escape route to avoid conflicts between ACTA and domestic 
U.S. law.231 The USTR’s position was troubling. By directly 
contradicting in the ACTA context the position it took in China—
Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, the position signaled disturbing inconsistency, if not 
outright hypocrisy. 
Even worse, if other countries shared the USTR’s position with 
respect to ACTA and applied it to the TRIPS Agreement, one has to 
wonder whether the TRIPS Agreement will still offer any 
meaningful protection to intellectual property rights holders. In a 
way, Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement will become a major 
loophole that justifies virtually all forms of noncompliance with the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
Thus, by making a creative interpretation of the TRIPS language 
used in ACTA to defray criticisms of the unnecessarily secretive 
negotiations and the lack of public consultation, the USTR 
unintentionally harmed its own position vis-à-vis other WTO 
members. This impact, to some extent, is similar to the unanticipated 
damage caused by the United States’ short-sighted exploration of 
compulsory licensing as an option to lower the price of ciprofloxacin 
following anthrax attacks in 2001.232 Such exploration not only 
 
 230. TRIPS Agreement art. 1. 
 231. See James Love, USTR’s Implausible Claim that ACTA Article 1.2 Is an All 
Purpose Loophole, and the Ramifications if True, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L 
(Oct. 22, 2010, 02:23PM), http://keionline.org/node/990; Mike Masnick, US 
Basically Says It’ll Ignore Anything in ACTA that It Doesn’t Like . . . So How 
About Everyone Else?, TECHDIRT (Oct. 25, 2010, 06:34AM), http://www.tech 
dirt.com/articles/20101025/01382311559/us-basically-says-it-ll-ignore-anything-
in-acta-that-it-doesn-t-like-so-how-about-everyone-else.shtml. 
 232. See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual 
Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 280 (2002) 
(“The U.S. lost significant international legitimacy when the overwhelming 
hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were juxtaposed against the efforts 
of developing countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.”); Susan K. Sell, 
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suggested a double standard, but has also greatly undermined the 
country’s ability to convince its trading partners to refrain from using 
compulsory licensing to meet public health needs. 
C. ARTICLE 41.5 
Article 41.5 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “[n]othing in 
[Part III of the Agreement] creates any obligation with respect to the 
distribution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and the enforcement of law in general.”233 This 
provision states explicitly that a WTO member is not required to 
devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than to 
other areas of law enforcement. It further invites the DSB to evaluate 
whether the resource demands for intellectual property enforcement 
are disproportional to demands in other areas.234 
The provision is particularly important to less developed countries. 
During the TRIPS negotiations, these countries were deeply 
concerned about the need to reallocate a considerable amount of 
resources to set up specialized intellectual property courts or 
strengthen intellectual property enforcement.235 These concerns were 
 
TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 481, 515–16 
(2002) (noting that the series of events surrounding the United States’ response to 
high drug prices during the anthrax attacks “caught the attention of the access 
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Doha”); Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential 
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(“The anthrax scare and the threatened shortage of Cipro forced all WTO Members 
to ask how much of a prisoner they want to be of their own patent systems.”); José 
Marcos Nogueira Viana, Intellectual Property Rights, the World Trade 
Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
311, 313 (2002) (“U.S. and Canadian approaches to the anthrax scare is precisely 
what the Brazilian government has been doing over the past two years in response 
to HIV/AIDS.”); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 
827, 874 n.247 (2007) (discussing how the United States’ proposal can be 
distinguished from the request for compulsory licensing by less developed 
countries). 
 233. TRIPS Agreement art. 41.5. 
 234. See Jayashree Watal, US–China Intellectual Property Dispute—A Comment 
on the Interpretation of the TRIPS Enforcement Provisions, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. 605, 610–11 (2010) (noting that countries “could use the last sentence in 
article 41.5 as a defence against the disproportionate deployment of resources 
needed to implement these standards or, as was the case in this dispute, to pursue 
criminal prosecutions in IP infringement cases”). 
 235. See GERVAIS, supra note 111, at 440 (“The two principal stumbling blocks 
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so severe that less developed countries specifically demanded the 
inclusion of Article 41.5 in the TRIPS Agreement. As Professor 
Correa recounted: 
The last paragraph of Article 41 was not suggested in the original U.S. 
and EC proposals. It was included in order to address the concerns of 
developing countries, based on a proposal by the Indian delegation. This 
was in fact one of the few provisions in Part III where developing 
countries’ views made a difference.236 
As far as the present dispute is concerned, Article 41.5 is of 
additional significance to China and thereby provides an instructive 
lesson for other less developed countries. In retrospect, the existence 
of the provision partly explains the United States’ reluctance to file a 
WTO complaint against China over a lack of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights based on a general impression, as 
compared to noncompliance based on the violation of specific TRIPS 
provisions.237 After all, if China is able to show that its resource 
demands in the area of intellectual property enforcement have far 
exceeded those in other areas of law enforcement, China is likely to 
prevail. 
In the end, the United States filed an “as such” complaint,238 which 
 
during the TRIPS discussions were the ironing out of differences amongst legal 
systems and the need to take account of many developing countries’ availability of 
resources.”). 
 236. UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 109, at 585. 
 237. See Yu, supra note 173, at 935. 
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Dumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan: 
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Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, ¶ 
168 (Dec. 15, 2003). But see Gervais, supra note 31, at 549 (noting that the WTO 
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violations”); Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential 
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the lack of detail in the enforcement provisions the US argument was really more 
of a non-violation complaint. The essence of what the USA was really complaining 
about was that a benefit it expected from the TRIPS Agreement was better levels 
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took away China’s potential defense under Article 41.5. 
Notwithstanding the United States’ preemptory tactics, China still 
advanced arguments based on Article 41.5 in response to the U.S. 
charge that its criminal thresholds failed to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement. As it contended, the provision, along with Article 1.1, 
provided the much-needed context for interpreting the TRIPS 
Agreement.239 Although the panel ultimately rejected China’s 
arguments based on either provision, it acknowledged that “Article 
41.5 is an important provision in the overall balance of rights and 
obligations in Part III of the TRIPS Agreement.”240 It also treated 
Article 41.5 somewhat differently from Article 1.1. Instead of 
declaring that Article 41.5 does not permit the use of resource 
constraints “to justify any derogation from the basic obligation to 
give effect to the provisions on enforcement”—the wording used in 
Article 1.1241—the panel merely noted China’s failure to substantiate 
how the lack of thresholds would have overburdened its criminal law 
system.242 Implicitly, the panel recognized the possibility of using 
resource constraints to justify derogations from TRIPS enforcement 
obligations. 
In a way, the present panel report suggested that a future WTO 
panel could consider the shift of burdens, responsibilities, and risks 
of enforcement from private rights holders to national governments, 
especially those in the less developed world. In the report’s closing 
paragraph, the panel also noted clearly that its task was not “to 
review the desirability of strict IPR enforcement.”243 After all, the 
second sentence of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement gives 
member states the power to “implement in their law more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such 
protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.”244 
 
of enforcement.”). 
 239. See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 1, ¶ 7.481. 
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Thus, one could argue that, through this carefully worded report, the 
panel has sent some subtle warning signals to developed countries, 
which, despite the compromise made at the TRIPS negotiations, 
continue to aggressively push for TRIPS-plus enforcement norms to 
the detriment of less developed countries. 
CONCLUSION 
In China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO panel, for the first time, 
focused its report primarily on the interpretation and implementation 
of the TRIPS enforcement provisions. The report not only provides 
certainty and clarity to a WTO member’s TRIPS enforcement 
obligations, but also enables the United States to receive redress of 
some of its complaints over inadequate intellectual property 
protection and enforcement in China. 
More importantly from the standpoint of less developed countries, 
the panel report enables them to score some important points in the 
interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. For example, the report 
underscores the importance of having minimum standards and 
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement and the longstanding treatment 
of intellectual property rights as private rights. It also rejects the use 
of bilateral, plurilateral, or regional trade agreements to divine 
meaning in the TRIPS language. In addition, the report appreciates 
the divergent local market conditions in each WTO member while 
continuing the use of an evidence-based approach for resolving 
WTO disputes. In short, the report provides considerable hope and 
encouragement to less developed countries, which only recently are 
beginning to make more frequent use of the WTO dispute settlement 
process. 
To be certain, the report includes some disappointments—most 
notably in its lack of discussion of Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. Nonetheless, it leaves the door open for future efforts to 
elaborate on the content, meaning, and implications of these 
provisions. The panel’s discussion of Article 41.5 also suggests its 
willingness to entertain greater challenges in the area so long as the 
respondent produces sufficient substantive and nonanecdotal 
evidence to show that the resource demands in the area of intellectual 
property enforcement have far exceeded those in other areas of law 
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enforcement. 
Immediately after the release of the present panel report, 
policymakers, industry representatives, and commentators were 
quick to determine whether China or the United States has prevailed. 
Whether intended or not, however, less developed countries might 
have become the dispute’s ultimate winner. As an African proverb 
says, when two elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. In this 
dispute, the grass not only has not been trampled, but it has become 
even greener than before. 
 
